基于不同过网费率的可中断负荷电力市场库诺特模型研究

Research on Power Market Cournot Model of Interruptible Load Protocol based on Different Wheeling Cost Rates

在电力系统中,为了有效平衡供电需求,电力需求侧管理已经得到广泛的关注和应用,而可中断负荷管理是电力需求侧管理的重要组成部分.当发电商侧处于库诺特博弈的电力市场中,考虑发电商要支付过网费率,建立可中断负荷协议电力市场需求函数,分三种情况讨论库诺特博弈均衡点.利用仿真结果证实模型合理性.在发电商需要支付过网费率相同时,实行可中断负荷协议后,电力市场均衡价格及其波动性都明显降低;过网费率越小,波动性越小,价格越平稳.

In a power system, power demand side management （DSM） , of which interruptible load protocol is an integral part, has been widely used to balance power supply and demand, attracting widespread interest. This paper attempts to build a power demand function with interruptible load protocols when power generation side is in power market of Kunot game, and generation companies have to pay wheeling cost rate. The equilibrium point of Kunot game is discussed from three perspectives. Finally, the rationality of the model is verified by simulation results, and the equilibrium price and volatility of the power market are significantly reduced after the interruptible load agreement is implemented when generators need to pay the same wheeling cost rate. Besides, the lower the wheeling cost rate is, the smaller the volatility will be and the more stable the price will be.