制造商生产规模不经济的双渠道供应链融资策略研究

The Financing Strategy of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Manufacturer's Diseconomies of Scale

在对称信息框架下,本文构建一个生产规模不经济的双渠道制造商和一个存在资金约束的零售商组成的供应链系统,基于Stackelberg博弈理论考察延期支付与金融机构借贷模式下双渠道供应链的运作策略。模型分析发现,双渠道供应链各主体最优产品定价与制造商生产规模不经济系数均成正比,需求和利润与制造商规模不经济系数均成反比;在制造商存在生产规模不经济情形下,当零售商面临资金约束困境时,制造商延期支付合同的设计可以有效解决零售商资金不足问题,实现供应链无资金约束时的收益;尽管外部金融机构提供借贷,但当制造商生产规模不经济系数较低时,零售商始终不会选择金融机构借贷模式;数值模拟发现,当制造商对延期支付时间长度敏感性较低时,零售商会偏爱金融机构借贷融资模式,否则零售商始终偏爱延期支付模式。

In the case of symmetric information framework,a dual-channel supply chain model is constructed,in which the manufacturer is diseconomies of scale and the retailer is capital constrained. By using the Stackelberg game theory,the deferred-payment model and the loan-payment model are considered to dispose the retailer＇ s capital insufficient problem. The model analysis shows that the optimal product pricing of each supplier in the dual channel supply chain is directly proportional to the diseconomies coefficient of the manufacturer＇s production scale,and demand and profit are inversely proportional to diseconomies coefficient of manufacturer＇s scale; in the case of the existence of a diseconomies of manufacturer＇s scale,when the retailer is capital constraint,the manufacturer＇s deferred payment contract can effectively solve retailer＇s insufficient funds problem and realize the benefits when the supply chain is not capital constraint; the retailer would never choose loan payment model when the diseconomies of scale elasticity coefficient is low; the numerical simulation shows that the retailer will prefer loan payment model when the manufacturer is less sensitive to the length of deferred payment,otherwise,the retailer always prefers deferred payment model.