独立董事特征与高管薪酬业绩敏感性

Independent Directors' Characteristics and Payment-Performance Sensitivity of Executives

独立董事制度普遍被认为是对公司高管薪酬激励契约进行监督制约的重要机制。以2016年我国沪深两市A股1981家上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了独立董事特征与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系。研究发现:独立董事的独立性、声誉越强,越能发挥对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的监督作用;独立董事是否具有会计、金融等知识的教育或工作背景对高管薪酬业绩敏感性没有显著的影响,据此提出完善我国独立董事制度的建议。

The independent director system is generally considered to be an important oversight mechanism of the company＇s executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we choose 1981 listed companies as the sample from Shanghai and Shenzhen capital markets in 2016, and then we empirically test the relationship between the independent directors＇ characteristics and the executives＇ payment performance sensitivity. We find that the more independent and the higher reputation the independent directors, the higher the executives＇ payment performance sensitivity, whether the independent directors have the education or work background in accounting and finance has nothing to do with the executives＇ paymnet performance sensitivity. And finally some suggestions are proposed in this paper.