基于SD动态博弈的新能源汽车供应链补贴策略优化

Study on optimal subsidy strategy in new energy vehicle supply chain based on SD game model

补贴退坡政策将对我国新能源汽车产业发展产生重要影响,退坡成效也将直接影响后续替代政策的制定和实施。这些新能源汽车政策牵涉到政府、企业、消费者和社会等多方决策主体,它们相互间存在着显著的博弈关系。本文首先采用博弈论建立了补贴政策下新能源汽车供应链生产决策模型,解析了新能源汽车补贴机制及其影响,求解并证明了最优补贴强度及退坡临界点的存在,设计并提出了政府补贴效率、消费者补贴获得率等指标,进而针对有限次博弈、决策周期不一致、信息不对称、关键决策参数变异等实际问题,基于"反应函数"将传统博弈论与系统动力学相结合,分析补贴退坡下新能源汽车市场的博弈均衡与演化规律。研究结果表明,SD动态博弈模型能够较好地呈现传统博弈论的分析结果,证明新能源汽车企业对政府补贴存在着高依赖性;政府补贴强度一旦突破合理区间,补贴策略将失效或面临财政资金缺口的困境。消费者对新能源汽车的市场认可度越高,新能源汽车企业变相提价幅度越大,消费者获得的正补贴则越少,补贴政策效率越低。新能源汽车技术进步与消费者偏好对补贴政策均有显著的替代效应;决策周期不一致将对补贴政策造成短期扰动,但不会改变其中长期效应;信息不对称和关键决策参数变异均会加剧系统博弈震荡,甚至导致补贴政策崩溃和市场退化。最后,对补贴退坡下我国新能源汽车市场的发展前景进行了综合预测。本文研究可为后补贴时代我国新能源汽车产业政策的优化和企业生产决策提供一定的支持。

Subsidy exit policy would play an important role in the development of China’s new energy vehicle industry,and the effects of subsidy exit policy would also directly affect the formulation and implementation of substitution policy. Generally speaking,these new energy vehicle policies involve many decision bodies such as government,enterprises,consumers and social individuals and so on,and there are significant game relationships among them. This paper firstly adopted game theory to build a production decision model on new energy vehicle supply chain with government subsidy policy. Then it used this model to analyze new energy vehicle’s subsidy mechanism and its effects,obtain optimal subsidy intensity and prove the existence of critical point to cancel subsidy policy,design and put forward a serial of indexes such as government subsidy efficiency and consumer subsidy acquisition. Furthermore,considering traditional game theory model facing many application difficulties such as finite game tights,decision period inconformity,information asymmetry and key decision parameter variation,it combined the traditional game theory and the system dynamics( SD) game model to study the game equilibrium and evolution law of new energy vehicle market with subsidy exit policy based on game reaction function.The research results showed that SD game model would perfectly reflect the analysis results using traditional game theory and prove the high dependence of new energy vehicle enterprises on government subsidy. Once the government subsidy intensity beyond the reasonable limits,the subsidy policy would be ineffective or be in dilemma of fiscal fund gap. The higher the new energy market acceptance,the higher the disguised price the new energy vehicle enterprises raise,the less positive subsidies consumers obtain and the lower efficiency of government subsidy policy has. The technological progress of new energy vehicle and consumer preference have significant substitution effect on subsidy policy. Decision period inconformity would result in short-term disturbance on subsidy policy but couldn’t change subsidy policy’s mid-term or long-term effects. Information asymmetry and key decision parameter variation would aggravate system gaming shock and even result in subsidy policy crash or market degradation. Lastly,it predicted the development prospects of China’s new energy vehicle market with subsidy exit policy. This research would provide support for optimization of China’s new energy vehicle industrial policy and vehicle manufacturers’ production decisions.