独立董事特征与两个任期内监督效果变化

Characteristics of independent directors and the changes of supervision effect of the independent directors during two tenures

在我国,上市公司广泛存在第二类代理问题,而独立董事制度被引入的初衷就是对管理层以及大股东进行有效监督,继而缓解第二类代理问题。本文结合我国独有的独立董事任期制度,探究那些连任第二个任期的独立董事在两个任期内监督效果的变化。我们提出两个假说:"经验能力假说"与"人际关系假说"。通过研究,我们发现全体独立董事样本支持了"人际关系假说"。根据是否有财务背景对独立董事进行分组,我们发现拥有财务背景的独立董事样本支持"经验能力假说",无财务背景的独立董事样本支持"人际关系假说"。

In China,“the second agency problem”is very serious in the listed companies.The purpose of independent director mechanism in Chinese listed companies is to supervise CEOs and to alleviate“the Second Agency Problem”.Combined with Chinese unique independent director tenure system,this article explores the changes of supervision effect of the independent directors who serves the second tenure.We put forward two hypotheses:“experience and competence hypothesis”and“interpersonal relationship hypothesis”.From research,the conclusion of all the independent directors verifies the“interpersonal relationship hypothesis”.We group independent directors on the basis of financial background.The conclusion of independent directors with financial background verifies the“experience and competence hypothesis”.The conclusion of independent directors without financial background verifies the“interpersonal relationship hypothesis”.