中国不同所有制企业对外直接投资的区位选择——一种交易成本的视角

Ownership Types and the Location Choice of Chinese Enterprises' Outward Direct Investment: A Transaction Costs Perspective

区位选择是跨国企业对外直接投资的重要议题。现有研究已注意到企业属性和制度环境等因素对区位选择的影响,但仍缺乏将其加以综合的统一理论框架。以交易成本为视角,作者构建了一个分析框架用以理解不同所有制企业在面对不同政治制度时的区位选择。以签订契约为界,投资者与东道国间的交易成本分为事先的缔约成本和事后的治理成本。同时,不同企业与东道国政治制度间的交易成本受其所有制类型影响。由于民主制通常在投资准入阶段的缔约成本较高,而否决者数量越多则投资实施阶段的治理成本越少,故中国企业总体上倾向于赴民主程度较低、否决者数量较多的国家投资。考虑到企业所有制,相较于民营企业,国有企业面临更大的进入壁垒和软预算约束,这提高了缔约成本而降低了治理成本,故会选择民主程度较低、否决者数量较少的区位。2000年至2012年中国企业对外直接投资事件数据库为上述机制提供了经验检验。

Location choice is a critical decision in outward direct investment for transnational enterprises.Existing research noticed that both corporate and institutional factors affect location choice of transnational enterprises.Still,there is absent of a unified theoretical framework that integrates these factors.From the perspective of transaction costs,the authors construct an analytical framework to understand the location choice of enterprises with different ownership types in the face of different political institutions.Taking the contracting timing as a boundary,the transaction costs between the enterprise and the host country contain both ex ante transaction costs called contracting costs and ex post transaction costs called governing costs.Meanwhile,ownership types vary in transaction costs in terms of different enterprises and the host country s political institutions.Since democratic regimes usually have higher contracting cost in the phase of investment access and larger veto players lower the governing costs in the enforcement phase,Chinese enterprises generally tend to choose locations with lower democratic degree and more veto players.Considering ownership types,state-owned enterprises encounter greater barriers to entry and softer budget constraints compared to private-owned enterprises,which increases their contracting cost and lowers governing cost.Therefore,state-owned enterprises would choose to invest in locations with lower democratic degree and fewer veto players.A dataset using Chinese enterprise-level investment events from 2000 to 2012 provides empirical supports for the aforementioned mechanism.