摘要
[目的/意义]为了发挥用户群体互动在抑制社交媒体平台虚假新闻传播时的关键性作用,有效刻画用户群体信息行为与社交媒体平台功能设计之间的复杂关系。[方法/过程]通过建立社交媒体平台与用户群体之间的演化博弈模型,并提出审核和激励机制,运用Matlab软件对其功能效果进行模拟仿真。[结果/结论]结果显示:社交媒体平台可通过设置一定力度的审核和激励机制提高群体互动的质量,并且审核机制的力度和准确性、高质量群体互动的额外成本、奖惩措施的力度等因素对审核和激励机制的作用效果有着重要影响。
[Purpose/Significance]The purpose of this paper is to play the key role of user group interaction in suppressing the spread of fake news on social media platform,and effectively depict the complex relationship between user group information behavior and social media platform function design.[Method/Process]This paper proposes an audit and incentive mechanism of social media platform by establishing an evolutionary game model between the social media platform and the user community,and then simulates the functional effects of this mechanism by using Matlab software.[Result/Conclusion]The results show that the social media platform can improve the quality of group interaction by setting audit and incentive mechanisms within a certain range.Factors including the range and accuracy of this mechanism,the additional cost of high-quality group interaction,the intensity of rewards and punishments have important impacts on the effectiveness of this audit and incentive mechanism.
作者
王诣铭
夏志杰
罗梦莹
Wang Yiming;Xia Zhijie;Luo Mengying(School of Management,Shanghai University of Engineering Science,Shanghai 201620;Faculty of Economics and Management,East China Normal University,Shanghai 200241)
出处
《情报杂志》
CSSCI
北大核心
2019年第12期98-106,140,共10页
Journal of Intelligence
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“非常规突发事件中社会化媒体不实信息的群体干预模式研究”(编号:14BTQ026)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“新媒体中考虑群体差异的谣言传播机理及干预策略研究”(编号:71503163)
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目“突发事件中社会化媒体可信信息的特征识别研究”(编号:17YJCZH199)的研究成果之一
关键词
社交媒体
虚假新闻
群体互动质量
审核激励机制
演化博弈
social media
fake news
quality of group interaction
audit and incentive mechanism
evolutionary game model