一种新的哲学批判何以可能?——拉康与胡塞尔

Lacan and Husserl:How Is a New Philosophical Critique Possible?

胡塞尔将超越论的建构刻画为从本质现象学到意向心理学的建基生成,并将此建构的基础具身化为零位身体从原区分、相互压抑到意向融合的构造,而拉康则对此作出了两个关键性的突破:首先,在镜像阶段理论中揭示出意向融合的本质是误认和异化;其次,以根基于客体小a的存在的拓扑构型改写了纯粹意识的流形结构。胡塞尔以母婴间身体性的融合关联为基础建构零位存在,但拉康认为,零位存在最终建基于在先于前摄的“将来”相位上永恒涌动的客体小a,正是通过对这种特殊客体具有的新的本质化和时间化的揭示,我们在拓展现象学的直观与存在范围的同时,也获得了一种新的哲学批判的可能。

Husserl describes the transcendental constitution as a generative process proceeding from eidetic phenomenology to intentional psychology,embodied in the genesis of the zone-point body out of the procession from primary differentiation and mutual repression into intentional integration.Lacan makes two crucial breakthroughs here:firstly,his mirror-stage theory reveals that the essence of intentional integration consists in misrecognition and alienation;secondly,based on the object a,he replaces the manifold structure of pure consciousness with the topological structure of Being.Unlike Husserl,who regards the corporal and integral mother-infant relation as the foundation of zone-point Being,Lacan proposes that zone-point Being is ultimately based on the object a,which permanently flows in its“future”phase prior to protention.Through the revelation of the new essentializing and temporalizing functions of this special object,the phenomenological realm of intuition and being expands itself,and a possible new philosophical critique emerges.