委托代理关系下被动房激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Passive House Promotion Based on Principal-Agency Relationship

政府有效激励机制在被动房发展导入初期阶段起着决定性作用。通过构建政府-开发企业委托-代理模型研究被动房政府激励机理,在对模型进行复刻仿真分析的基础上,得出结论:开发企业被动房开发积极性与被动房产量呈现正向相关性,开发企业被动房开发积极性与政府补贴额度关系则受到信息传递的影响。最后,建议政府应结合实际采取激励措施:应对企业进行相应监督、应重点激励行业龙头企业、激励机制的设计应考虑经济环境与企业风险偏好。

Effective incentive mechanism in a goverment plays a key role in the initial stage of passive house development. In order to analyze the incentive mechanism of the passive house,this paper constructs the principal-agent model between the government and enterprise. Through the simulation analysis of the replica model,the results showthat there is a positive correlation between the development enthusiasm and output,while the relationship between the development enthusiasm and government subsidies is affected by the information transmission. Finally,this paper proposes that government should take some incentive measures: supervising the enterprises accordingly,encouraging leading enterprises,considering economic environment and enterprises’ risk preference in the design of incentive mechanism.