摘要
创新是影响企业核心竞争力的关键因素,如何激励企业创新已成为当今重要的研究议题。为此,本文以2006-2016年实施的302份股票期权方案为样本,采用倾向得分匹配法和双重差分模型得出如下结论:(1)实施股票期权能够促进企业创新产出。(2)风险承担效应是股票期权激励企业创新产生的主要内在机制。(3)非高管授予比例较大、授予范围较小、激励期限较长、行权比例递增、价内程度较低、行权业绩考核相对宽松时,能够更好地发挥股票期权的风险承担效应,增加激励对象承担风险的意愿,从而提升企业创新产出。本文的研究结论可以为上市公司选择是否实施股票期权及如何设计股票期权方案提供参考。
Along with the rapid development of technology,innovation has become a key factor,determining the core competitiveness of a corporation.As a result,how to motive corporate innovation has become increasingly important nowadays.Among various innovation incentive mechanisms,stock options are considered to be an effective tool.To investigate how such a compensation scheme would act on corporate innovation,this paper collects 302 stock options incentive plans announced and implemented between 2006 and 2016,and analyzes whether the corporate innovation output is improved after the implementation of stock options.The Propensity Score Matching and difference-in-difference model are used for the empirical analysis.It is concluded that(1)stock options do inspire corporate innovation output;(2)stock options tend to stimulate corporate innovation through two channels including the risk-taking incentive effect and the performance-based incentive effect and the ultimate driving force tends to be dominated by the former mechanism;(3)the risk-taking incentive effect is stronger when the non-executives granting proportion is larger,the granting range is smaller,the incentive period is longer,the exercisable proportion is increasing,the price-to-strike ratio is lower and the performance assessment standards are easier to be met,as all these criteria may encourage employee risk taking and hence leading to a higher level of innovation output.Our research verifies the incentive effect of stock options on corporate innovation output and proves that the risk-taking incentive effect of stock options is the principle driving mechanism.Moreover,it also expands the horizon of options’elements research and fills in the gap of the innovation-oriented stock option contract design based on the risk-taking incentive effect.Last but not least,this research proves that the requirements of imposing performance assessment and the forbiddance of repricing may generate negative impact on the innovation incentive of stock options.This would provide valuable references to companies in designing relevant stock option scheme and key elements.
作者
石琦
肖淑芳
吴佳颖
Shi Qi;Xiao Shufang;Wu Jiaying(School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology;Guangzhou SUN YAT-SEN University A sset Management Co.Ltd)
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期27-38,62,共13页
Nankai Business Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71672010、71972010、71672007)资助。
关键词
股票期权
创新产出
风险承担
业绩激励
要素设计
Stock Option
Innovation Output
Risk-taking Incentive
Performance-based Incentive
Elements Design