摘要
加强对监理和总承包商的控制,能有效地保证EPC工程质量,降低道德风险发生的可能性,从而保证投资效益。利用三方演化博弈理论,建立业主、监理与总承包商之间的三方演化博弈模型,通过制订合理的奖惩标准,来促使三方自愿选择合作。分析表明,量化业主在不同情况下设置奖励与惩罚的合适大小,既能有效地达到控制监理与总承包商的目的,减小三方之间的利益冲突,又能合理控制成本,将奖励负担降到合理的程度。
Strengthening the control of supervision and general contractor can effectively guarantee the quality of EPC project,reduce the possibility of moral hazard,and thus ensure the investment benefit.By using the theory of tripartite evolutionary game,the paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model between the owner,the supervisor and the general contractor.By formulating reasonable reward and punishment standards,the three parties can choose cooperation voluntarily.Shows that quantifying the appropriate size of incentives and penalties set by the owner under different circumstances can not only effectively control the supervisor and the general contractor,reduce the conflict on interest among the three parties,but also reasonably control the cost and reduce the incentive burden to a reasonable extent.
作者
潘裕敏
张晓琪
PAN Yumin;ZHANG Xiaoqi(Army Logistics University of PLA,Wuhan 430035,China)
出处
《工程经济》
2020年第11期36-39,共4页
ENGINEERING ECONOMY
关键词
三方演化博弈
EPC
复制动态方程
复制动态相位图
tripartite evolutionary game
EPC
duplicate dynamic equation
copy dynamic phase diagram