村庄公共产品供给中的互惠规范——一个外生性互惠制度供给框架的构建

Norm of Reciprocity in the Supply of Village Public Goods:An Exogenous Reciprocal Institutional Supply Framework

村庄公共产品供给是实现乡村振兴的有力保障,但面临着多层次、多主体间的互惠困境,以致难以实现有效供给。基于博弈理论,本文遵循"博弈困境—博弈模型—博弈机制—制度供给"的分析逻辑,阐述了互惠困境对村庄公共产品供给的影响机理,构建了制度供给视角下包含基本机制、匹配原则及治理模式的一个外生性互惠制度供给框架,并剖析了其制度供给逻辑。研究发现:关系型机制、社会契约型机制、显性契约型机制和偏好改变型机制有助于实现互惠困境中的帕累托最优均衡;基于基本机制和匹配原则,"宗族权威+亲缘关系""文化权威、道德权威、经济权威+熟人关系"以及"多边惩罚+社会杠杆"和"第三方参与式治理+服务型政府观念"等三种治理模式,能够有效地促进村庄公共产品供给主体间的互惠发展,形成供给主体间的互惠规范,维护其合作稳定。

This article analyzes the games and reciprocity dilemmas among the suppliers of village public goods.On the basis of the simplified model of the Hume’s problem’s reciprocal cooperation dilemma,which is a dynamic game model with complete information,the study analyzes four kinds of mechanisms to form the reciprocal cooperation equilibrium among the suppliers from the perspective of reciprocal game constraints in providers.These four types of mechanisms can be termed as relationship mechanism,social contract mechanism,explicit contract mechanism and preference mechanism.The study further constructs an exogenous reciprocal institutional supply framework as well as a governance model.It finds that the four types of mechanisms contribute to the realization of Pareto optimal equilibrium in the dilemma of reciprocity.Based on the basic mechanism and matching principle,"clan authority+kinship"and"cultural authority,moral authority,economic authority+acquaintances relationship","multilateral penalty+society leverage"and"third party participatory governance+service-oriented government"can effectively improve the level of reciprocity among village public goods suppliers,establish the reciprocity among supply entities and maintain their cooperation stability.