摘要
竞业限制已经无法解决企业间互相挖角引发的人才争夺难题,为了避免同行业恶意挖角,互不挖角协议成为企业间控制人才流失、抑制用工成本的创新方式。但互不挖角协议带来的限制人才、阻碍人力资源市场自由竞争问题受到各国反垄断执法机构重点关注。互不挖角协议在形式上有纯粹型与附属型之别,在反垄断法律属性上有合法与违法之异,构成垄断协议与滥用市场支配地位是其主要法律风险。各国对具有排除、限制竞争效果的互不挖角协议处罚严厉,风险外溢时企业往往难以承担高额罚款甚至刑事责任。企业要洞悉互不挖角协议的合规风险重点,完善企业反垄断合规制度对风险进行管理。发挥政府监管对企业合规的激励作用,以最终实现企业人力资源市场的健康有序发展。
No-competition agreements have been unable to solve the problem of talent competition caused by mutual poaching between enterprises,in order to avoid malicious poaching with peer companies,no-poaching agreements have become an innovative way to control brain drain between enterprises,curb labor costs.However,the problem of restricting talent and hindering free competition in the human resources market brought about by the no-poaching agreements have been paid more attention by the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies in various countries.No-poaching agreements are purely different in form and subsidiary type,there are legal and illegal differences in the legal attribute of anti-monopoly law,and it is the main legal risk that constitutes monopoly agreement and abuse of market dominance.Countries have a strict penalty for no-poaching agreements that exclude and limit competition,and it is often difficult for enterprises to bear high fines or even criminal liability when risks spill over.Enterprises should understand the compliance risk focus of no-poaching agreements,and improve the enterprise anti-monopoly compliance system to manage risks.Give full play to the incentive role of government supervision to corporate compliance,in order to finally achieve the healthy and orderly development of the enterprise human resources market.
作者
凌尧帆
胡晓琪
喻玲
Yaofan LING;Xiaoqi HU;Ling YU(Law School,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013)
出处
《中国人力资源开发》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第12期86-98,共13页
Human Resources Development of China
基金
江西省2020年度研究生创新专项资金项目(YC2020—S277)。
关键词
互不挖角协议
垄断协议
法律风险
企业合规
人才竞争
No-poaching Agreements
Monopoly Agreements
Legal Risk
Corporate Compliance
Talent Competition