公众监督下地铁施工企业行为演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Theoretical Analysis of Subway Construction Enterprise’s Behavior under Public Supervision

为促进地铁施工企业规范化施工,减少潜在的安全和环境风险,构建了公众监督参与的地铁施工企业和政府部门的策略行为演化博弈模型。借助系统动力学仿真,模拟了双方策略行为的演化趋势,探讨了奖惩激励机制和公众监督对博弈双方策略行为的影响。结果表明:当政府的惩罚与奖励水平较低时,博弈系统不存在演化均衡策略;奖惩激励机制和公众监督均能有效引导企业规范化施工以确保环境质量;对企业无序施工按60 d连续计罚时,企业与政府策略行为达到(规范化施工,定期检查)稳定均衡,相应均衡点为(0,0.775);此外,公众监督参与是引导企业-政府合力改善施工环境质量的必要条件。

To promote subway construction enterprises to adopt standardized construction and reduce potential safety and environmental risks,an evolutionary game model was established to discuss behavioral interaction between subway construction enterprises and local governments under public participation.With the help of system dynamics simulation,the two-party evolvement trend of the strategy behavior was simulated,and the influence of subsidies,penalties and public supervision on the two players’behavioral strategy was discussed.The results show that the system fails to reach evolutionarily stable equilibrium under insufficient administrative subsidies and penalties.Reward-punishment incentive mechanism and public supervision can effectively stimulate enterprises’regular construction to ensure environmental quality.When disorderly construction of enterprises is punished for 60 consecutive days,the evolutionary strategies of enterprises-government can reach a stable equilibrium(standardized construction,regular inspection),and the corresponding equilibrium point is(0,0.775).Furthermore,public supervision is also necessarily to promote a joint strategy for both enterprise and government to improve construction environmental quality.