摘要
新审计报告模式下,对细节信息的披露加大了审计师责任,加剧了审计师与客户(尤其是有盈余管理动机的企业)之间的冲突,审计师将面临独立性考验:严格执法以减轻自身责任还是妥协并帮助客户减少关键审计事项(KAM)披露以隐藏关键信息。我们发现:第一,盈余管理程度严重代表审计风险更大以及更多KAM被揭露的可能,我们在客户不重要的情况下发现了盈余管理与KAM之间的正相关关系,而在客户重要的情况下,两者关系不显著。客户越重要,严重盈余管理与更多KAM披露之间的正相关关系越不明显。该结果可归因为经理人在盈余管理动机下游说审计师减少KAM披露以掩盖盈余管理。第二,国际四大的声誉机制和中注协约谈机制有助于改善独立性,审计师即使面对重要客户,也不会被经理人游说而减少KAM披露,而会根据盈余管理严重程度做出对等程度的KAM披露。研究结论有助于提醒监管层:尽管KAM改革给审计师带来压力,但是他们的独立性状况并没有改变,而是在有限的政策空间内帮助重要客户减少信息披露并将自身隐藏起来。
Under the new audit report model,the disclosure of detailed information increases auditors responsibilities and the conflict between auditors and companies(especially companies with earnings management motives).Auditors will face the test of audit independence:strict enforcement to reduce their own responsibilities or compromise and help companies reduce KAM disclosures to hide key information.We found that:First of all,theoretically,the severity of earnings management represents greater audit risk and the possibility of more KAM disclosures.However,we only found that earnings management is positively correlated with KAM when the clients are not important,while the relationship between the two variables is not significant when the clients are important.The more important the client is,the less obvious the positive correlation between serious earnings management and KAM.We attribute this to the manager s lobbying auditors to reduce KAM to cover up earnings management under the motivation of earnings management.Secondly,Big 4 s reputation and the AICPA interview help to improve independence.Even if the auditors face important clients,they will not be persuaded by managers to reduce KAM,but will make equivalent KAM disclosures based on the severity of earnings management.Our research helps to remind the supervisory authorities:Although the KAM reform puts pressure on auditors,their independence status has not been changed.Instead,they have helped important clients reduce information disclosure within a limited policy space.
作者
付强
廖益兴
FU Qiang;LIAO YiHsing(School of Accounting,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China;College of Business,Chung Yuan Christian University,Taipei 320314,China)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第1期53-68,共16页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(19BJY034)
湖北经济学院科研培育项目(PYZD201904)。
关键词
KAM披露
盈余管理
客户重要性
审计独立性
审计声誉
审计报告改革
会计监管
KAM disclosure
earnings management
client importance
audit independence
audit reputation
audit report reform
accounting supervision