科学思想实验的划界问题研究:技术细节及其缺省

Demarcation of Scientific Thought Experiments:Technicality of Particulars or Its Default

作为理论创新的源泉和方法,思想实验在科学中的重要地位不言而喻。如何通过逻辑结构等科学史之外的方法对思想实验是否有效做出判定,却一直存在困难。使用索伦森模态反驳模式和彭罗斯熵的粗粒化定义进行分析,可以发现,在思想实验中同时对熵的“粒度”与“测量”做缺省配置,会破坏不相容场景与反事实条件的解释相关性。对于涉及层级与突现的思想实验而言,其逻辑结构的有效性,建立在概念基础所依赖的呈“正交补”关系的两个技术细节不能同时缺省的基础之上。这种覆盖了布里渊对麦克斯韦妖的“负熵”解释,揭示了索伦森与丹内特两种研究进路存在着内禀关联,论证了从科学史之外的判定条件为科学思想实验划界是可能的。

Regarded as the origin and methodology of academic innovation,thought experiments evidently play dominant rolls in science.Throughout,it is difficult to assess the validity of thought experiments by methods from logical structure other than that from history of science.According to the result of analysis from Sorensen’s alethic refuters and Penrose’s coarse-graining definition of entropy,our study shows that simultaneous default of entropy both on granularity and on measurement in thought experiments destroys the explanatory relevance between incompatibility of scenarios and counterfactual conditionals.The validity of logical structure of thought experiments applying levels and emergence yields to whether one of technical particulars of concept in relationship of orthogonal complement is avoided to be defaulted.The paper covers the Brillouin’s negentropy interpretation of Maxwell’s demon,reveals the intrinsic correlation of the research approaches from Sorensen and Dennett,and proves that an alternative to conditions from history of science exists on demarcation of scientific thought experiments.