中国PPP项目的双边道德风险研究

An Empirical Study on the Bilateral Moral Hazard Problem in China's PPP Projects

政府与社会资本合作模式(PPP)是基础设施和公共服务供给的重要方式,社会资本和政府的双边道德风险对中国PPP项目投资意愿和投资规模的影响有待深入探讨。基于手动收集的2015年和2016年中国PPP项目数据和测算的政府与社会资本双边道德风险指标,采用Heckman模型来实证检验中国PPP项目投资意愿与投资规模如何受到政企双边道德风险的影响。结果表明:(1)中国地方政府在PPP项目立项招标中居主导地位,因而政府道德风险水平越高,即地方政府负债率越高或市场化水平越低或腐败程度越高,则PPP项目的投资意愿越高。(2)政府道德风险水平越高,PPP项目的投资规模越大;而企业道德风险水平越高,PPP项目的投资规模越小。因此,应加强PPP项目管理,鼓励民营资本积极参与PPP项目,以进一步规范和促进我国PPP模式的健康发展。

This paper empirically examines the impact of bilateral moral hazard from government and social capital on Chinese PPP project investment.Based on the manually collected data of China's PPP projects in 2015 and 2016,we compute bilateral moral hazard measures of government and social capital,and empirically investigate the impact of bilateral moral hazard on the probability and scale of PPP projects.It is found that,firstly,due to the dominant role of Chinese local government in the process of PPP project bidding,a higher degree of local government moral hazard,i.e.a higher local government debt ratio,or a lower level of marketization,or a higher level of corruption,will lead to a higher probability of PPP project.Secondly,the scale of PPP projects is positively correlated with the degree of local government moral hazard,but negatively correlated with that of firm moral hazard.Based on these empirical findings,it is proposed that in order to formulate and promote the healthy development of PPP in China,we need to strengthen the regulation of PPP projects and encourage the active participation of private capital.