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政府实现对农业企业绿色发展的有效监督——基于博弈论视角

Realization of Government’s Effective Supervision on the Green Development of Agricultural Enterprises——From the Perspective of Game Theory
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摘要 在“双碳”背景下,绿色农业是对保护环境、低碳生活的积极响应,是实现中华民族永续发展的必要条件。但因为监管监督的低效,导致一些农业企业不愿绿色转型。其实监管监督的有效性实则是农业企业和政府部门之间的博弈,通过构建政府部门和农业企业的博弈模型,发现有效的监管机制是农业企业实现绿色转型的重要驱动因素。同时为政府和企业提供建议,来为农业绿色化提供一些理论依据。 In the context of"double carbon",green agriculture is a positive response to environmental protection and low-carbon life,and is a necessary condition for the sustainable development of the Chinese nation.However,due to the inefficiency of regulatory supervision,some agricultural enterprises are reluctant to make a green transformation.In fact,the effectiveness of regulatory supervision is actually a game between agricultural enterprises and government departments,and through the construction of a game model between government departments and agricultural enterprises,it is found that an effective regulatory mechanism is an important driving factor for agricultural enterprises to achieve green transformation.At the same time,it provides suggestions for governments and enterprises to provide some theoretical basis for agricultural greening.
作者 王玕珺 Ganjun Wang(School of Economics,Guizhou University,Guiyang,Guizhou,550000,China)
出处 《管理科学与研究(中英文版)》 2022年第10期61-64,共4页 Management Science and Research
关键词 博弈 绿色农业 有效监督 Game Green Agriculture Effective Supervision
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