信息不对称背景下能源可中断契约的设计

Design of Interruptible Energy Contract in the Context of Asymmetric Information

每年夏冬两季,我国部分地区经常出现电力、天然气等供应偏紧局面。目前,可中断契约已在国内得到广泛应用。通过构建三种信息结构下的能源可中断契约设计模型,研究最优可中断契约、调峰投入水平和供应商收益的影响因素,结果表明:可中断契约可以激励工业用户参与能源调峰工作,供应商偏向选择中断能力更强、调峰效率和外部性更高的工业用户;信息不对称不仅会导致工业用户降低调峰投入水平,而且会扭曲最优可中断契约;工业用户只能从中断能力信息中获得信息租金,当工业用户调峰效率较高且调峰辅助外部性达到一定阈值时,供应商收集与中断能力相关的工业用户私人信息能够获得更高的信息价值。

Focusing on energy supply tensions,we establish models for the design of interruptible energy contract under three information structures. The impacts of relevant factors on the optimal interruptible contract and peak shaving input level and benefits of the supplier are studied. Contract distortion,information rent and information value are discussed. The results indicate that the interruptible contract can motivate industrial users to participate in energy peak shaving,and the supplier prefers to choose industrial users with stronger interruption capabilities and higher peak shaving efficiency and externality. Asymmetric information will not only cause industrial users to reduce peak shaving input level,but also distort optimal interruptible contract.Industrial users can only obtain information rent from interruption capability. When peak shaving efficiency of industrial users is high and the externality of peak shaving auxiliary service reaches a certain threshold,the supplier can obtain higher information value by collecting industrial users’ private information related to interruption capability.