财务困境和掏空动机双叠加下终极股东控制链变动

Research on the Change of Ultimate Shareholder’s Control Chain under the Superposition of Financial Distress and Tunneling Motivation

本文以2004-2019年间金字塔结构企业集团控制链变动为研究对象,考察财务困境和掏空动机双叠加下高管因素、股东因素对终极股东控制链变动的影响。研究结果表明,终极股东是金字塔结构企业集团控制链变动的主导。从高管因素角度看,财务困境和掏空动机双叠加时,终极股东有了高管的助力,增加了铺设掏空隧道的控制链变动,同时也因为没有了高管的辅助,减少了铺设掏空隧道的控制链变动,财务困境是终极股东掏空动机下与高管合谋借助控制链变动铺设掏空隧道的诱因。从股东因素角度看,具有掏空动机的终极股东通过控制链变动增强资金侵占能力,此行为不会因财务困境程度呈现显著差异。具有掏空动机且财务困境小的样本中,现金流权高的终极股东面对高资产负债率上市公司增加了铺设掏空隧道的控制链变动。掏空动机和财务困境叠加时,现金流权高的终极股东增加了控制链变动概率,且偏好于延长股权控制链,但面对高资产负债率上市公司终极股东放弃了控制链变动。

This paper takes the control chain changes of pyramid enterprise groups as the research object,studies the impact of the principal-agent problem arise from the change of ultimate shareholder control chain under tunneling motivation.The results show that the ultimate shareholder is the leading factor in the change of control chain of pyramid enterprise group.The perspective of executive factor,when financial distress and tunneling motivation are ovelaped,the ultimate shareholder with the help of executives increases the change of control chain for the laying of tunneling.At the same time,without the assistance of executives,it reduces the change of control chain for the laying of tunneling.Financial distress is the incentive for the ultimate shareholder to collude with executives laying tunneling through the change of control chain under the tunneling motivation.From the perspective of the shareholder factor,the ultimate shareholders’meeting with tunneling motivation enhances the ability of capital occupation through the change of control chain,and will not show significant differences due to financial distress.The ultimate shareholders with tunneling motivation and high cash flow right have significant control chain change when the asset liability ratio is high.When financial distress and tunneling motivation overlap,the ultimate shareholders with high cash flow rights give up the control chain change of tunneling when listed companie’s asset liability ratio is high.Further research shows that the ultimate shareholders with high cash flow rights prefer to extend the control chain under the superposition of financial distress and tunneling motivation.