风险规避下考虑CSR补贴的闭环供应链决策

Closed-loop supply chain decision-making considering CSR subsidy under risk aversion

为研究成员风险规避行为和政府的企业社会责任(corporate social responsibility,CSR)补贴政策对制造商主导和CSR投入的闭环供应链定价决策和回收渠道选择的影响,构建制造商回收模式(supply chain model for manufacturer recycling,SM)和零售商回收模式(supply chain model for retailer recycling,SR)下的闭环供应链博弈模型,比较两种模式下的最优决策.研究表明:政府的CSR补贴可降低产品零售价,提高回收率和CSR投入水平,其中零售商回收时效果更为显著;根据成员风险规避系数差额和临界值选择回收渠道有利于提高回收率,从消费者和制造商的角度,零售商回收模式更佳;政府根据企业的风险规避系数差额制定CSR补贴额度,可确保当前回收渠道的合理性和各成员利润的平衡性.

In order to investigate the effects of members'risk aversion behaviour and the government's corporate social responsibility(CSR)subsidy policy on manufacturer-led and CSR input closed-loop supply chain pricing decisions and recycling channel selection,supply chain model for manufacturer recycling(SM)and supply chain model for retailer recycling(SR)are constructed,and the optimal decisions of the two modes are compared.The results show that the government's CSR subsidies can reduce the retail price of products,improve the recycling rate and CSR input level,and the effect is more significant when retailers recycle.From the perspectives of consumers and manufacturers,the retailer recycling model is better,and from the perspective of increasing the recycling rate,the recycling channel can be rationally selected based on the comparison of the difference in members'risk aversion coefficients with the critical value.The government sets the CSR subsidy amount according to the difference of risk avoidance coefficient of the enterprise,which can ensure the rationality of the current recovery channel and the balance of profits of all member.