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基于演化博弈的共享停车参与主体收益分配策略

Revenue Distribution Strategy of Shared Parking Participants Based on Evolutionary Game
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摘要 大城市停车矛盾日益严重,共享停车成为缓解停车难的新途径,但参与主体收益分配不均成为导致其不能快速推广的原因之一。基于此,运用演化博弈探讨共享停车泊位的各参与者之间的均衡收益及合作策略,考虑了共享停车的共享停车平台、停车管理公司和泊位拥有者三方主体的利益,分析了不同停车泊位购买/租赁情景下的收益分配策略,包括全为泊位拥有者一次性购买、一次性购买和租赁混合以及全为租赁的3种情景。首先解析了共享停车平台、停车管理公司和泊位拥有者的三方博弈策略关系,建立了不完全信息下共享停车三方主体演化博弈模型,其次对三方利益主体博弈策略的复制动态系统方程进行稳定性分析,最后进行理论推导和模拟仿真分析。仿真结果表明:(1)当共享停车平台补贴增加50%时,演化收敛速度加快了20%;(2)当停车管理公司获得收益增加50%时,演化收敛速度加快了36%;(3)共享停车平台提高补贴额度、提高停车管理公司的获益比例有利于推进共享停车合作的达成;(4)得到了各利益相关者在以下3种情景下的收益分配策略:全为泊位所有者一次性购买、一次性购买和租赁混合以及全为租赁。研究结果可为解决共享停车中收益分配不明确问题提供新的思路,进而为有效推动共享停车发展提供理论参考。 Parking conflicts in large cities are a growing concern.Shared parking has emerged as a potential solution for alleviating parking difficulties.However,the uneven distribution of proceeds among participating entities has hindered its rapid promotion.This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore the equilibrium revenue and cooperation strategies among participants in shared parking berths.The interests of the three main stakeholders,namely,the shared parking platform,parking-management company,and berth owners,are considered.This study analyzes the revenue distribution strategy under different parking-berth purchase/leasing scenarios,including all one-time purchases for the berth owners,mixed one-time purchases and leasing,and all leasing,encompassing a detailed analysis of these three scenarios.First,the game strategy relationship among the three stakeholders was analyzed to establish an evolutionary game model of them under incomplete information.Second,the stability of the replicated dynamic system equations of the stakeholders'game strategy was analyzed.Finally,the game strategy relationship was analyzed using theoretical derivation and analog simulation.The simulation results show the following:①When the shared parking platform subsidy is increased by 50%,the evolutionary convergence speed is accelerated by 20%;②when the revenue of the parking-management company increase by 50%,the evolutionary convergence speed is accelerated by 36%;③it is beneficial for shared parking platforms to increase the amount of subsidy and percentage of revenue for parking-management companies to promote shared parking cooperation;④the following revenue distribution strategy for the stakeholders under the three scenarios were obtained:all one-time purchases for the berth owners,mixed one-time purchases and leasing,and all leasing.This study provides new insights into addressing the issue of unclear revenue distribution in shared parking,thereby providing theoretical guidance for effectively promoting its development.
作者 胡晓伟 陈福存 安实 HU Xiao-wei;CHEN Fu-cun;AN Shi(School of Transportation Science and Engineering,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150090,Heilongjiang,China;Heilongjiang Key Laboratory of Intelligent Transportation Management and Technology,Harbin Institute of Technology,Harbin 150090,Heilongjiang,China)
出处 《中国公路学报》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2024年第9期250-262,共13页 China Journal of Highway and Transport
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(21YJCZH040) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资助项目(HIT.OCEF.2022026) 黑龙江省自然科学基金优秀青年项目(YQ2021E031)。
关键词 交通工程 共享停车 三方博弈 演化分析 收益分配 traffic engineering shared parking tripartite game evolutionary analysis revenue distribution
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