摘要
本文利用逐步回归和路径分析方法 ,检验了我国上市公司CEO薪酬的激励制约机制和激励制约效果。结果发现 :(1)决定CEO薪酬增长的因素主要是营业利润率变动 ,决定CEO薪酬下降的因素则主要是总资产净利率变动 ,这表明在我国上市公司的CEO薪酬层面已体现了一定的激励制约机制 ;(2 )增加CEO薪酬对提高企业的规模和股东财富均有一定的促进作用 ,但降低CEO薪酬却不仅不能提高企业规模和股东财富 ,反而会对其产生一定的负面影响 ,这不仅说明CEO薪酬也具有“工资刚性”特征 ,而且说明我国上市公司的CEO薪酬也仅有单方面的激励效果 ,而没有预期的制约效果 ;(3)无论是增加或降低CEO薪酬 ,CEO均不存在盈余管理或利润操纵的机会主义行为 ,这表明CEO进行盈余管理或利润操纵的动机不应该是为了增加其公开性薪酬 ,而应该是居于除公开性薪酬以外的其他目的。
This paper aims to analyze the effect of the incentive and restrictive mechanisms,which lies in the CEOs pay contract in Chinese listed firms.Stepwise regression and root analysis methods are adopted in our empirical study.Our research proves:(1)Operating profit is the major factor to influence the increasing of CEOs pay,while the declining of CEOs pay is decided by the return ratio on total assets,this result shows that the incentive and restrictive mechanism of the CEOs pay contract is effective in some extent;(2) To increase the CEOs pay leads to the expanding of firms size and stock-holders wealth in some degree,however,the declining of CEOs pay has negative effect on the above two,this result shows that the CEOs pay has rigid characteristic.Moreover,the CEOs pay contract has incentive effect,but has no expected restrict effect;(3)Whether the increasing or declining the CEOs pay,it isnt obvious relationship with the earning management,therefore,the earning management isnt for increasing the CEOs pay.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2003年第3期35-39,共5页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金"非对称信息下的公司资本结构优化理论与选择机制研究" (批准号 :79970 0 73 )项目
香港政府科学研究基金"AStudyoftheAssociationbetweenCulturalDimensionsandAspectsofAccountingCommunica tionandFinancialEvaluation"项目的阶段性研究成果之一
