混合所有制改革:硬化约束还是优化治理?——基于国企债务风险的研究

Mixed-ownership Reform:Hardening Constraint or Optimizing Governance?——Based on the Study of Debt Risk in SOEs

本文手工收集和整理了非金融上市国企前十大股东持股情况及董监高背景的有关信息,从股权结构和治理结构两个维度衡量混改程度,探究其对国企债务风险的影响及作用机制。结果表明:国企混合所有制改革有利于降低债务风险,且此种影响主要体现在商业竞争类国企和特定功能类央企中;上述影响并不是通过硬化约束、降低债务资源获取的客观便利性实现,而是通过优化公司内部治理、提高非债务融资能力,从而降低国企对债务资源的主观依赖实现,且非国有股东持股可以显著影响国企的股权融资能力,非国有性质董事参与治理可以提高国企的内源融资能力;政府质量及其治理水平的改善可以促进非国有股东参股对降低国企债务风险的作用发挥,但治理结构的影响未受到其调节;国企混改降低债务风险后,最终可以提高其经营绩效和市场绩效。

By manually collecting information about shareholding ratios of the top ten.shareholders and backgrounds of board directors and supervisors in the non-financial listed state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this article measures the degree of mixed-ownership reform from perspective of equity structure and governance structure so as to explore its impact on the debt risk in SOEs.The results show that mixed-ownership reform helps to reduce debt risk of SOEs and this effect mainly exists in state-owned enterprises of commercial competition and central enterprises of specific funetions.The above-mentioned influence is not derived from hardening budget constraint and reducing the availability of debt resources,but because of enhancing non-debt financing capabilities and optimizing the company's internal governance so as to mitigate the dependence of SOEs on debt resources.The change on the equity structure can significantly affect the equity financing ability of SOEs while the participation of non-state senior executives will improve the internal financing capabilities.Besides,the improvement of government quality can enlarge the function of optimization of equity structure while the role of non-state shareholders'participation in decreasing debt risk remains unchanged.Lastly,reducing the debt risk can ultimately improve operating performance and market performance of SOEs.