摘要
理论界普遍认为,委托-代理关系中存在的问题主要是信息的不对称造成的逆向选择和道德风险,逆向选择和道德风险会影响到社会经济的稳定和运行效率。对于这个问题,可以通过完善监控体制和采取激励机制加以解决。事实上,委托-代理关系中存在的问题主要是所有权外化所引起的剩余索取权、剩余控制权的分割问题。“经营权”是所有权的有机组成部分,它必然要求享有一定比例的剩余索取权和剩余控制权,委托人与代理人的博弈过程,就是这种比例关系的确立过程。在经济生活中,只有在代理人的要求被漠视的情况下,才有可能出现代理人利用信息的不对称谋求自身的利益,产生逆向选择和道德风险的问题。不能把委托-代理关系与雇佣劳动关系混为一谈,否则会造成社会经济生活的紊乱。
It is generally agreed in the theoretical field that the major problems in entrusting-acting relationship are reverse selection and moral risk caused by message asymmetry, which would influence the stability and operative efficiency of social economy. This may be solved by perfecting the supervision and encouragement systems. In fact, the problems in entrusting-acting relationship are those share ones of surplus demand and control right owing to ownership externalization. Since operation right is an organic part of ownership, it must require to share certain proportion of surplus demand and control right. And the game process between those of entrusting and acting is indeed a process of such proportional relationship establishment. In economic lives, only when the agent's requirement is overlooked could arise the problem that the agent seeks his own benefit by means of message asymmetry, which hence leads to reverse selection and moral risk. So the entrusting-acting relationship should not be confused with that of wage labour, or there would yield confusion in social economic lives.
出处
《北京师范大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第5期112-116,共5页
Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)
关键词
信息不对称
委托-代理关系
理性经济人
人力资本
剩余索取权
剩余控制权
期股
期权激励制度
message asymmetry
entrusting-acting relationship
rational economic man
human capital
surplus demand right
surplus control right
futures and stocks
futures right encouragement system