期刊文献+

Evolutionary snowdrift game with disordered environments in mobile societies

Evolutionary snowdrift game with disordered environments in mobile societies
下载PDF
导出
摘要 We investigate an evolutionary snowdrift game on a square N : L × L lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where a population of no (no ≤ N) players located on the sites of this lattice can either cooperate with or defect from their nearest neighbours. After each generation, every player moves with a certain probability p to one of the player's nearest empty sites. It is shown that, when p = 0, the cooperative behaviour can be enhanced in disordered structures. When p 〉 0, the effect of mobility on cooperation remarkably depends on the payoff parameter r and the density of individuals ρ (ρ = no/N). Compared with the results of p = 0, for small r, the persistence of cooperation is enhanced at not too small values of p; whereas for large r, the introduction of mobility inhibits the emergence of cooperation at any p 〈 1; for the intermediate value of r, the cooperative behaviour is sometimes enhanced and sometimes inhibited, depending on the values of p and p. In particular, the cooperator density can reach its maximum when the values of p and p reach their respective optimal values. In addition, two absorbing states of all cooperators and all defectors can emerge respectively for small and large r in the case of p 〉 0. We investigate an evolutionary snowdrift game on a square N : L × L lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where a population of no (no ≤ N) players located on the sites of this lattice can either cooperate with or defect from their nearest neighbours. After each generation, every player moves with a certain probability p to one of the player's nearest empty sites. It is shown that, when p = 0, the cooperative behaviour can be enhanced in disordered structures. When p 〉 0, the effect of mobility on cooperation remarkably depends on the payoff parameter r and the density of individuals ρ (ρ = no/N). Compared with the results of p = 0, for small r, the persistence of cooperation is enhanced at not too small values of p; whereas for large r, the introduction of mobility inhibits the emergence of cooperation at any p 〈 1; for the intermediate value of r, the cooperative behaviour is sometimes enhanced and sometimes inhibited, depending on the values of p and p. In particular, the cooperator density can reach its maximum when the values of p and p reach their respective optimal values. In addition, two absorbing states of all cooperators and all defectors can emerge respectively for small and large r in the case of p 〉 0.
出处 《Chinese Physics B》 SCIE EI CAS CSCD 2007年第12期3566-3570,共5页 中国物理B(英文版)
基金 Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No 10775060).
关键词 snowdrift game disorderd lattice MOBILITY COOPERATION snowdrift game, disorderd lattice, mobility, cooperation
  • 相关文献

参考文献22

  • 1Smith J M and Szathmary E 1995 The Major Transitions in Evolution (Oxford: Freeman).
  • 2Neumann J Von and Morgenstern O 1944 Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press).
  • 3Smith J M and Price G 1973 Nature 246 15.
  • 4Axelrod R and Hamilton W D 1981 Science 211 1390.
  • 5Sugden R 1986 The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (Oxford: Blackwell).
  • 6Nowak M A and May R M 1992 Nature 359 826.
  • 7Deobeli M and Knowlton N 1998 Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 05 8676.
  • 8Killingback T, Deobeli M and Knowlton N 1999 Proc. R. Soc. Lond B 266 1723.
  • 9Hauert C and Szab5 C 2005 Am. J. Phys. 73 405.
  • 10Cuan J Y, Wu Z X, Huang Z C, Xu X J and Wang Y H 2006 Europhys. Left. 76 1214.

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部