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分权理论及其在自然资源产权制度改革中的应用 被引量:12

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION THEORIES AND ITS APPLICATION IN THE REFORM OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES PROPERTY RIGHTS INSTITUTION
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摘要 明确划分中央和地方政府的资源产权利益分配关系既是我国自然资源产权制度改革的重要约束条件,更是研究的基本视角之一。分权型政府主导下的、有限制的自然资源产权制度在实践上表现为中央与地方政府的权利分配以及地方政府之间的区域竞争,这必然会对自然资源产权制度的变革方向产生重要影响。建立一个从分权到合作的M型分权模型,可以解释我国自然资源产权制度改革进程中政府间分权关系的演进趋势。 Dividing the resources property rights benefits allocation-relationship clearly between the central government, and local government is not only the important restrained condition in the reform of China's natural resources property rights institution, but also be one of the basic angle of researching. The restricted natural resources property rights institution leaded by decentralized government in practice for the performance of the power allocation between the central and local government and the region competi- tion among the local government Will necessarily influence the changing direction of the natural resources property rights institution. Building up the M type governmental decentralized model from decentralization to cooperation could explain the evolution trend of our country's government decentralization relation on the reform progress of natural resources property rights institution.
作者 刘灿 吴垠
机构地区 西南财经大学
出处 《经济理论与经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第11期5-11,共7页 Economic Theory and Business Management
基金 国家社会科学基金课题"我国自然资源产权制度构建研究"(06BJL004)
关键词 分权理论 自然资源 产权制度改革 政府间利益关系 fiscal decentralization theories the natural resources the reform of the natural resources property rights institution the benefits relationship among the government
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