基于Bertrand模型的关系型借贷和中小企业融资研究

A Research on the Relationship Banking and Finance for SMEs Based on Bertrand Competition Framework

信息不透明、缺乏与融资有关的有效信息、融资成本高是中小企业融资难的主要原因,关系型借贷实质上是银行和企业为克服金融交易中的市场失效而共同构建的一种制度安排。本文基于Bertrand成本控制的竞争框架,通过一个理论模型分析关系型借贷和银行的定价行为。研究表明即使借主与银行存在长期的关系,缺乏有效的融资信息迫使中小企业承担高贷款利率,同时从理论上解释中小企业经常面临借贷限制的原因。

Reliable information on small and medium-sized enterprises （SMEs） is rare and costly for financial intermediaries. Relationship-typed credit is by nature a system arrangement jointly built by banks and businesses to solve market invalidation in financial transaction, and has become an important means for solving small and medium-sized business financing problem. In this paper we offer a theoretical model to analyze relationship banking and the pricing behavior of banks in a Bertrand competition framework with monitoring costs. We show that the lack of reliable information leads to comparable high interest rates even if along-term relationship between borrower and bank exists. The paper offers a theoretical explanation why SMEs often are faced with borrowing constraints.