摘要
针对传统秘密共享方案不能事先预防参与者欺骗的问题,本文结合博弈论,提出了一种理性秘密共享方案,该方案基于双线性对,是可验证的,能检验参与者的欺骗行为.秘密分发者不需要进行秘密份额的分配,因此很大程度上提高了秘密分发的效率.在密钥重构阶段,不需要可信者参与.参与者偏离协议没有遵守协议的收益大,理性的参与者有动机遵守协议,最终每位参与者公平的得到秘密.另外,所提方案可以防止至多m-1成员合谋.经过分析它们是安全和有效的.
To correct the problem that traditional secret sharing scheme can not take precautions against cheat,in this paper, we propose a rational secret sharing scheme. The proposed scheme based on bilinear pairing is verifiable and the participants' cheat can not work. The dealer docsn' t need a secret share distribution. Therefore, the scheme greatly improves the efficiency of secret distribution. In addition, the trusted party is eliminated in the secret reconstruction phase. The gain of following the protocol is more than the gain of deviating,so rational player has an incentive to abide by the protocol. FinaUy, every player can obtain the secret fairly.Moreover,the scheme can withstand the conspiracy attack with at most m - 1 players.By analysis, we find the scheme is se- cure and effective.
出处
《电子学报》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第5期1050-1054,共5页
Acta Electronica Sinica
基金
国家自然科学基金(No.61170221)
国家973重点基础研究发展规划(No.2007CB311106)
北京市自然科学基金(No.1102003)
关键词
理性秘密共享
博弈论
双线性对
单向函数
rational secret sharing
game theory
bilinear pairing
one-way function