外部选择与关系专用性投资激励——基于GHM模型的研究

Outside Option and Incentives for Co-specific Investment——Studies based on GHM Model

现实中的契约总是不完全的,当自然状态被参与人观察到之后,为了保证交易有效率,通常会对事前契约进行再谈判。首先,论文研究了事后再谈判时参与人的外部选择对事后合作租金的分配影响及事前关系专用性投资激励问题;其次,根据外部选择是否具有约束力,将外部选择区分为威胁点和现状点。研究结果显示:当外部选择为现状点时,不完全契约会导致事前关系专用性投资不足;而如果事后外部选择为威胁点时,投资方会作出有效率投资或投资过度。

When drawing up a contract in real contracted process, it is often incomplete. The players usually negotiate the ex-ante contract for the efficient exchange after the status were observed by the players. The paper studied how the outside options affected the distribution to the ex-post cooperative rents and the incentives for co-specific investment through ex-post bargaining. The paper distin- guished the outside options between threat points and status points based on the fact if the contract is constraint. The incomplete may in- duce the ex-ante inefficiency of co-specific investment when the outside option is treated as status point. But it may induce ex-ante effi- cient investment or overinvestment if the outside option is treated as threat point.