基于信誉机制的理性秘密共享方案

Rational Secret Sharing Scheme Based on Reputation Mechanism

理性秘密共享是博弈论与传统秘密共享相结合产生的新的研究方向。在理性秘密共享中,参与者从利益最大化的角度选择行为,在秘密重构阶段易出现"空威胁"和最后一轮不合作的问题。本文基于博弈论分析完全理性参与者在信誉机制下的行为偏好,采用激励相容原理,设计信誉惩罚机制,构建一个理性秘密共享方案。该方案通过信誉惩罚机制有效的约束完全理性参与者的行为,避免出现"空威胁"。并由信誉最高的参与者充当"可信中心"进行秘密重构,有效的解决在秘密重构阶段最后一轮各个参与者相互不合作的问题,防止参与者相互合谋的行为。

Rational secret sharing is a new hot topic, which is generated at the intersection of game theory and traditional secret sharing. The players choose actions by maximizing their payoff in the rational secret sharing. It is easy to cause the ＂empty threat＂ and non-cooperation in the last round of the secret reconstruction phase. This paper proposed a rational secret sharing scheme based on analyzing the preference of rational players in the repu- tation system using game theory, and designing the reputation punishment mechanism with the incentive compati- bility. It effectively restricts the behavior of the completely rational players by reputation punishment mechanism, and avoids the ＂ empty threat＂. Meanwhile, the secret was reconstructed by the highest reputation player that serves as ＂trusted center＂. The proposed scheme effectively solves the problem of non-cooperation and collusion of each player in the secret reconstruction phase.