我国垄断行业与竞争行业高管薪酬激励效应比较——以煤、电、纺织、服装业为例

Comparison of CEO Compensation Incentive Effect between Monopoly Industries and Competitive Industries of China——Taking Coal,Electricity,Textile and Garment Industry as an Example

根据沪、深股市2006—2011年电力、煤炭、纺织业、服装业上市公司的数据,运用面板估计方法比较我国垄断行业与竞争行业高管薪酬激励效应的差异,结果表明:垄断行业上市公司的高管薪酬与公司业绩不相关,而竞争行业高管薪酬与公司业绩正相关;垄断行业的公司业绩与高管持股比例无显著相关性,而竞争行业高管持股比例与公司业绩正相关。因此,垄断行业国有企业高层管理者的政治激励高于薪酬激励,企业运行市场化程度依然不高,还需进一步加快国有企业体制改革的步伐。此外,研究也证明通过股权制衡可以抑制控股股东的"侵占"行为和大股东之间的"内耗",从而提高公司的治理效率和业绩。

According to the data of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of electric power,coal,textile and garment industry during 2006-2011,the difference of CEO compensation incentive effects between monopoly industries and competitive industries of China is compared by panel estimation method,and the results show that the CEO compensation in monopoly industries in listed companies is not related to their company performance,however,the CEO compensation in competitive industries in listed companies is positively related to their company performance,that the company performance of monopoly industries is not significantly related to the ratio of the CEO shareholding,however,the ratio of the CEO shareholding in competitive industries is positively related to their company performance.Thus,the political incentive for the CEOs in state-owned enterprises of monopoly industries is higher than compensation incentive,the marketization degree of the enterprises operation is still not sufficient,and the step for state-owned enterprise system reform should be further accelerated.Besides,the research also shows that the ＂embezzlement＂ of shareholders and ＂internal struggle＂ between shareholders of the enterprises can be reduced by equity control so that the management efficiency and performance of the companies can be raised.