摘要
文章选择两阶段资金约束型供应链为研究对象,以零售商运营资金不足作为前提条件,构建基于保兑仓模式的供应链融资模型,研究采用数量折扣契约时供应链的协调情况。结合中国企业的实际,构建保兑仓模式下银行利率模型,应用Stackelberg博弈模型求解出银行、制造商、零售商各自决策的最优参数,通过集中决策与分散决策对比发现,无数量折扣时,分散决策不能实现供应链的完美协调;有数量折扣时,制造商选取的折扣点和折扣量在一定条件下,可以使零售商和制造商的收益同时增加,达到供应链的完美协调,即实现改进供应链整体运作绩效的同时达到互惠共赢的目标。
This paper studies a two-level finance-constrained supply chain of a producer and a retailer. When retailers are short of operation funds, we construct the supply chain financing model of confirming warehouse, and use the quantity dis- count contract to coordinate the supply chain. Firstly, combining the Chinese enterprise practices, we build the bank rate model under confirming warehouse, and then we use the Stackelberg game model to determine the optimal parameters of the bank, manufacturer, and retailer. By comparing the centralized situation with the decentralized, we find that in non-quanti- ty discount contract, the decentralized decision can' t achieve supply chain system coordination. In quantity discount con- tract when the discount and rebate the manufacturer choose is given, the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer has been improved. The whole supply chain coordinated as well, which means we achieve the goal of mutual benefit and double win and improve the operation performance of supply chain at the same time.
出处
《天津大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第1期12-17,共6页
Journal of Tianjin University:Social Sciences
基金
天津市科技发展战略计划研究基金资助项目(12ZLZLZF06000)