摘要
A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period, targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device. The firms＇ optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that, under imperfect targeting, when the advertising cost is low enough, both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals＇ old segments. This equilibrium, which could not exist under perfect targeting, results in two opposite results. When cost is high, the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits; on the contrary, when cost is low enough, it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting, so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis- targeting degree.
研究了双寡头市场条件下,基于不完美定向的定向广告竞争模型.通过两阶段博弈来描述新产品或升级产品引入时不完美定向对企业广告及定价决策带来的影响.第一阶段通过价格竞争辨识消费者,第二阶段广告作为传递产品信息和价格歧视的工具.比较分析不完美定向与完美定向情况下企业的广告和定价策略,均衡结果显示:在不完美定向条件下,当广告成本足够低时,会出现在完美定向情境下不可能出现的均衡,即两企业均会选择向对方的优势市场投入广告.这一均衡的存在会导致2种相反的结果:当广告成本较高时,不完美定向能缓和价格竞争并增加企业利润;但当广告成本足够低时,随着不完美定向程度的增加,反而会加剧市场竞争并导致企业利润损失,因此,企业有动机降低定向误差的程度.
基金
The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71371050)
