“公共部门扩大陷阱”对历朝驿传和漕运体系崩溃的解释

Explains on Public Sector Expanding Trap on the Every Dynasty's Postal System and Water Transport of Grain to the Capital

中国历朝驿传和漕运体系相同的崩溃形态是受制于公共部门扩大陷阱演化规律的深层次制度问题。公共选择学之寻租理论揭示了公共部门扩大陷阱的诱致原因,即公共部门创立后,不同的公共部门之间以及公共部门与私营部门之间,始终存在着对资源的占有、控制、收益等的博弈。在支出政策选择上,政治家总是倾向于扩大规模,扩大开支,以满足持续性地维护特定群体的利益并得到其支持的目的。这种博弈过程总是很快地走向负和博弈,日益造成巨大的社会成本,并不可逆转。

The same form of collapse of China＇s every dynasty＇s postal system and water transportation system is subject to deep-seated problems of public sector expand trap evolution law system. Rent-seeking theory of public choice study reveals that reasons of the public sector to expand the induced trap are there always exist resources possession, control, and proceeds of the game after the public sector founded, among different public sectors and between public sector and private sector. On spending policy choice, politicians have a tendency to expand scale and spending, in order to meet the interests of specific groups and get their support in protecting constantly. This kind of game process always goes negative game, and quickly cause huge social costs, and irreversible.