摘要
The article concerns the normative value of truth in relation to lie. Based on arguments derived primarily from ancient philosophers （Eubulides, Plato, Aristotle）, medieval philosophers （St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas）, the thinker of the Renaissance---Machiavelli, the main philosopher of the Enlightenment--Kant, the 19th-century author of Beyond Good and Evil （Nietzsche）, and contemporary thinkers such as Derrida and Lacan, the author considers here truth as a normative value. Lying is relative to the truth, and it has no ontological legitimacy, even it cannot exist without truth itself. In the final part of the article, the author concludes that the truth, however, cannot lead to clearly had effects, be harmful or cause pain disproportionate to the effects caused by lie. Therefore, it must coexist with the good--the other parent value. Only when both values complement each other can we talk about the normative value of truth. The truth should be correlated with other values on which value systems are based, especially the good of a person or group of persons, avoiding harm towards others, and the protection of a person＇s health and life. Only then can the truth be appropriate to use. It is not an immovable foundation, but a dynamically functioning value, in which language and the ethical （active） dimensions provide the value of the specified situations. The truth can be a double-edged sword： It may hurt, but it can defend itself. The latter function seems to be the most important type of the normativity of truth.
