期刊文献+

考虑零售商竞争的产品售后服务能力运营策略研究 被引量:15

After-sales Service Capacity of Operation Strategy Considering Retailers Competition
下载PDF
导出
摘要 开展服务运营管理逐步成为提升供应链核心竞争优势的重要途径。针对一个制造商和两个零售商构成的产品服务供应链,以零售商提供竞争性服务为视角,研究产品售后服务能力运营策略。依据零售商与制造商之间不同的权利结构,分别从零售商Stackelberg、制造商Stackelberg和垂直纳什三种情形,求解供应链成员企业的均衡策略。根据服务能力水平和零售价格之间的动态变化关系,界定了实惠型、经济型、专业型和品质型四种不同的客户类型。并结合服务成本与不同渠道权利结构下均衡结果之间的变化关系,提出能够适应不同客户需求特征的产品售后服务能力运营策略:MS低成本运营策略、VN服务质量增强策略、RS产品质量增强策略和RS产品服务集成化策略,有效地推动了产品服务动态竞争机制研究。 As competition in the product sales market becomes intense, operation management is an important way to enhance the overall competitive advantage of a supply chain. In this paper, service competition models under three circumstances are constructed for retailers based on the Stackelberg game. In addition, product/service competition strategies meeting different needs of customers are provided in order to improve customer service satisfaction and profitability of supply chain members. At present, a wide range of value-added activities related to products are offered to customers in order to enhance enterprise competitiveness and the profitability of domestic and foreign retailers. These activities include after-sales service support, product quality improvement, product maintenance, etc. Competition between retailers has been gradually extended from price competition to service competition. Under the complex environment where rice and service competition coexists, it is important to address the following three problems for retailers:(1) how to cooperate with manufacturer closely;(2) how to use product service operation strategy to strengthen communication with customers in real time, and(3) how to create more customer value. Traditional game models were mainly used to study competition between two retailers, from the perspective of product price or quantity. However, the relationship between product service resource input and customer demand change is not analyzed in depth. Currently, production strategy, ordering strategy, and cooperative advertising strategy are investigated in the operation management. However, very few studies examined the competition process of after-sales service ability. For supply chains consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, after-sales service's operation strategies are studied from the perspective of service provided by retailers. The equilibrium strategies of supply chain members are solved in three different situations, including Retailers Stackelberg, Manufacturers Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash, based on different power structures between manufacturers and retailer. A numerical experiment is used to verify equilibrium results in these models. The results show that wholesale price shows a decreasing trend, but service capacity level and retail price show an increasing trend with the increase of service cost factor. In conclusion, customers are divided into four different categories based on optimal strategies under the abovementioned situations: affordable, economical, professional and quality pattern. The means of anglicizing dynamic variation between service capacity level and retail price is adopted. Meanwhile, after-sale service's operation strategies are proposed to meet different kinds of customer demand: MS low-cost operating strategy, VN service quality enhancement strategy, RS product quality enhancement strategy and RS product service integration strategy. The relationship between service cost and equilibrium results under different channel rights structure is investigated. This study can help understand the dynamic mechanism of product/service competition.
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第1期88-95,共8页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272117) 陕西省社会科学基金资助项目(2014P17) 陕西省教育厅科学研究项目计划资助基金(12JK0023) 陕西省社科联2013年度重大理论与现实问题研究资助项目(2013Z023) 陕西省重点学科建设专项资金资助项目(1201)
关键词 售后服务 服务能力 权利结构 供应链协调 产品服务集成 after-sale service service capacity power structure supply chain coordination product service integration
  • 相关文献

参考文献18

  • 1Ingene,C. A.,Parry,M.E. Channel coordination when retailerscompete[J].M-arketing Science, 1995, 14(4):360-377.
  • 2Oczkowski, E. An econometric analysis of the bilateral monopolymodel[J]. Economic Modelling, 1999,16(1): 53-69.
  • 3Sudhir, K. Structural analysis of manufacturer pricing in the presenceof a strategic retailer. Marketing Science, 2001, 20(3):244-264.
  • 4Tsay, A.A., Agrawal, N. Channel dynamics under price and servicecomp-etition[J].Manufacturing Service Operations Management,2000,2(4):372-391.
  • 5Boyaci,T., Gallgo, G" Supply chain coordination in a market withcustom-er service competition[J]. Production & OperationsManagement, 2004, 13(1):3-22.
  • 6Choi S C. Price competition in a channel structure with a commonretail-er[J]. Marketing Science, 1991,10(4):27! -296.
  • 7Ximin Huang, Sin-Man Choi. On supply chain coordination for faJsefail-ure returns: A quantity discount contract approach [J].International Joumal of Production Economics, 2011, 133(2):634-644.
  • 8Tansev Geylani, Tansev Geylani, Kannan Srinivasan. StrategicManufactur-er Response to a Dominant Retailer[J]. MarketingScience, 2007,26(2):164-178.
  • 9林欣怡,黄永,达庆利.两周期零售商竞争下的闭环供应链的定价和协调策略研究[J].运筹与管理,2013,22(2):27-33. 被引量:21
  • 10申成霖,卿志琼,张新鑫.零售商竞争环境下分散式供应链的定价与交货期联合决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(3):38-44. 被引量:18

二级参考文献100

共引文献159

同被引文献136

引证文献15

二级引证文献80

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部