外部选择权增加一定会刺激专用性投资吗——基于云南烟草合同的微观证据

DO INCREASES IN OUTSIDE OPTION ENHANCE THE INCENTIVES OF SPECIFIC INVESTMENTS——A Micro-evidence from Tobacco Contracts of Yunnan Province

学术界对于外部选择权和专用性投资的关系一直存有争论。产权理论(主要是GHM模型)认为当事人外部选择权增加会提高谈判力,从而提高参与人的专用性投资激励,这是产权成为最重要激励工具的基本逻辑。然而,另一些学者则认为,当参与人外部选择权是紧的时候,外部选择权增加反而会降低参与人的投资激励。这意味着,产权不一定能够提高激励。本文在梳理已有文献争论的基础上,构建理论模型重新定义了外部选择权的范围,并在非合作博弈的框架下,得到与后一部分学者一致的结论:外部选择权的增加反而会降低参与人专用性投资的激励。同时,笔者使用云南烟草合同的微观数据,实证分析了外部选择权和专用性投资之间的关系,发现两者呈负相关关系,这进一步支持了该结论。本文的发现与主流的产权理论有所不同,具有一定的理论贡献和现实意义。

There are different ideas about the relation between outside option and specific investments in academic fields The property theory（mainly GHM model）thinks that the increases in outside option will protect the profits from specific investments,hence strengthen the investors＇ incentives of specific investments They consider that increases in outside option increase specific investments However,some scholars think increases in outside option can also reduce the level of specific investments,when the outside option is binding This means more property may not lead to more specific investments This paper tries to make clear this dispute,and builds a new theoretical model based on a new definition about outside option in a non-cooperative game framework The results show that given this new environment increases in outside option also can lower the incentives of specific investments Moreover,we firstly give an empirical test to the relation between outside option and specific investments by using the micro contract data of tobacco in Yunnan province in China,and find there is a negative relation between the outside option and specific investments The results,opposite to the main ideas of property theory,have some theoretical and practical meanings to some extent.