摘要
可再生能源配额制是实现可再生能源发电由固定电价制度向政府政策与市场机制共同作用的制度变迁。研究二者对中国电力市场及社会福利的影响可知:固定电价和配额制均可有效促进厂商增加绿电产量并减少煤电产量,但固定电价制度会产生社会福利的损失,而配额制则提高了社会福利水平;配额制不仅有助于提高可再生能源发电的技术进步水平,而且有利于实现卡尔多-希克斯改进。
The Renewable Portfolio Standards is an institutional change from the Feed-in Law support to the combined action between government policies and market mechanism. By comparing both effects on China＇s power market and social welfare, we realize that： both Feed-in Tariff and Renewable Portfolio Standards can be effective in increasing the green electricity and reducing coal-fired electricity, but the Feed-in Tariff causes the loss of social welfare. The Renewable Portfolio Standards, not only contributes to the improvement of the technological progress, but also achieves the KALDOR-HICKS-IMPROVEMENT by increasing China＇s social welfare.
出处
《中国科技论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第9期90-97,共8页
Forum on Science and Technology in China
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71273088)
