摘要
国有企业改革本应是《中华人民共和国公司法》(简称《公司法》)修订中的重大问题,但学界似乎并不重视如何在公司法改革中完善国企制度,仿佛国企改革的出路就是减少或被消灭,或进一步私有化,此种改革逻辑并不符合宪法。我们应当关注宪法对公共经济形式尤其是国企地位的设计,通过公司法的改革进一步夯实国企的宪法地位。首先,在法律调整模式上,对国企最优的调整模式是制定《公共企业法》,次优的调整模式是在《公司法》中设立公共企业专章,无论何者都应废除《全民企业法》,修订《企业国有资产法》。其次,应当重构国企概念,对现实生活中纷繁复杂的国企类型进行“选择性定义”,扩大《公司法》对国有公司的调整范围,并以法定方式明确国企的存在领域,使国企主要服务于促进国家创新和满足民生需求,解决目前“主业控制”完全失效的现状。再次,应通过扁平公司治理层级、优化党组织参与方式、认可外部董事的法律地位、赋予公司自主设立监事会的权力等优化国企内部治理。最后,应通过强化出资人监管和民众参与方式,改进国企外部治理,鉴于国资监管已从“管资产”转向“管资本”,国有资产监督管理委员会应尽快变更名称。鉴于国资委所持国企股权是不同于普通股东权的“公共性股东权”,应仿照证券监督管理委员会的权力构造,以立法方式扩张国资委的出资人权力,赋予国资委对国有企业的特别调查权和特别制裁权;建立统一的网络信息披露平台,建立公民代表诉讼制度或公民集团代表诉讼制度,方便公民对国企董事、高管滥权现象进行诉讼监督。唯此,我们才会看到一个完全不同的国企世界。
The reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)should bethecritical issue in the revision of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China(the Company Law).But the academic community does not seem to attach importance to improving the SOE system in the reform of the Company Law,as if the destination of the state-owned enterprise reform is to reduce or eliminate the SOEs,or to further privatize them.And this kind of reform logic is not consistent with the Constitution.We should pay attention to the constitutional design of the public economic form,especially the status of SOEs,and further consolidate the constitutional status of SOEs through the reform of the Company Law.First,in terms of the legal adjustment mode,the optimal mode for theSOEs is to formulate the Public Enterprise Law;and the second-best mode is to set up a special chapter for public enterprises in the Company Law;and in any case,the National Enterprise Law should be abolished,and the Law on State-owned Assetsin Enterprises should be amended.Second,the concept of SOEs should be reconstructed;the complicated types of SOEs in real life should beselectively defined;the scope of adjustment of the SOEs under the Company Law should be expanded;and the existence field of SOEs should be clarified in a legal wayso that the SOEs can mainly servepromoting national innovation and meeting the needs of people's livelihood,and the existing problem of the completely ineffective"main business control"should be solved.Third,the internal governance of SOEs should be optimized by flattening the level of corporate governance,optimizing the way in which party organizations participation,recognizing the legal status of external directors,and empowering companies to set up independent supervisory boards.And fourth,we should improve the external governance of SOEs by strengthening investor supervision and public participation;and in view of the fact that stateowned asset supervision has shifted from“asset management”to“capital management”,the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission(SASAC)hasbeen more in name than reality,and its name should be changed as soon as possible.In view of the fact that the state-owned assets held by the SASAC are“public shareholder rights”that are different from common shareholder rights,we shouldfollow the power structure of the Securities Regulatory Commission and expand the power of investors in the SASAC by legislative means,and give the SASAC special investigation and sanction power on SOEs;and we should establish a unified online information disclosure platform,and establish a citizen representative litigation system or a citizen group representative litigation system to facilitate citizens to conduct litigation supervision on the abuse of power by directors and executives of SOEs.Only in this way will we see a completely different world of SOEs.
作者
蒋大兴
JIANG Da-xing(Law School,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)
出处
《中国流通经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第7期3-16,共14页
China Business and Market
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目“社会主义市场经济中的公共商行为及其规制”(14ZDC019)。
关键词
宪法
国有企业
国资委
公司法
公共企业法
the constitution
SOEs
SASAC
the company law
the public enterprise law