基于多属性招标拍卖的国有企业经理甄选机制设计

Manager selection mechanism in state-owned enterprises based on multi-attribute bidding and auction

为了有效解决非对称信息情形下国有企业治理中经理甄选问题,建立了一类事前对企业期望价值投标的多属性招标拍卖模型.通过竞标方对资产抵押投标保证其在事前对具有不可验证属性的企业期望价值投标时说“真话”,因为均衡时二者正相关;竞标方分别按自身期望利润最大化进行投标,最终管理技术类型最高、对国有企业期望价值投标最大、对资产抵押投标最多的竞标方中标,并且中标者可以创造相对最高的社会福利;模型最优时能够有效甄别竞标方的管理技术类型信息,在纳什均衡的意义上实现国有企业经营权的有效配置.

In order to effectively solve the problem of manager selection in the governance of state-owned enterprises with asymmetric information,a multi-attribute bidding and auction model for enterprises’expected value in advance is established.By bidding for asset mortgage,the bidders will say‘truth’when they bid for the expected value of the enterprise with non verifiable attribute,as the bids and the expected value are positively correlated in equilibrium.The bidders bid to maximize their own expected profit.The bidder with the highest final management technology type,the largest expected value bid for state-owned enterprises and the largest asset mortgage bid wins the bid.The winning bidder can create relatively higher social welfare.The model can effectively identify the management technology type of the bidders and realize an effective allocation of management right of state-owned enterprises in the sense of Nash equilibrium.