摘要
文章以2018“质押新规”颁布为政策冲击点,以2015—2021年我国A股上市公司数据为样本,探究该政策背景下控股股东股权质押对企业创新效率的影响。经研究发现:质押新规发布后,控股股东股权质押对企业创新效率存在抑制作用;与高科技行业相比,控股股东股权质押对企业创新效率的抑制作用在非高科技行业中更显著;在其他条件相同的情况下,税收优惠可在控股股东股权质押与创新效率之间起到对冲作用;进一步研究发现,质押新规会导致企业经营业绩下降,从而出现控股股东股权质押抑制企业创新效率的现象。
Taking the promulgation of the New Regulation on Pledge in 2018 as the policy impact point,based on the data of China's A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2021 as the sample,this paper explores the influence of equity pledge of controlling shareholders on enterprise innovation efficiency under the background of the policy.The results show that:after the release of the new regulation of pledge,the equity pledge of controlling shareholders has a inhibitory effect on the innovation efficiency of enterprises;compared with high-tech industries,the controlling shareholders'equity pledge has a more significant inhibitory effect on innovation efficiency in non-high-tech industries.Under other conditions being equal,tax incentives can play a hedging role between equity pledge of controlling shareholders and innovation efficiency.
作者
闫鑫
乐菲菲
张兴国
YAN Xin;YUE Feifei;ZHANG Xingguo(University of Jinan,Jinan Shandong 250002,China)
出处
《北京经济管理职业学院学报》
2023年第2期48-57,共10页
Journal of Beijing Institute of Economics And Management
基金
山东省社科规划项目“独立董事政治关联断损对企业创新的影响研究”(20CGLJ02)
山东省研究生导师能力提升项目“会计硕士专业学位研究生导师胜任力评价及提升策略研究”(SDYY18036)
济南大学社科项目“环境规制、政治关联丧失与企业技术创新研究”(18YY01)。
关键词
股权质押
创新效率
质押新规
税收优惠
equity pledge
innovation efficiency
new rules on pledge
tax benefits