摘要
如何发挥非国有董事治理积极性以提高国有企业审计意见质量,实现国有资产保值增值,是深化国有企业改革亟需研究的问题。以2013—2022年A股国有企业上市公司为样本,构建离散选择模型,以投非赞成票代理非国有董事治理积极性。研究发现,非国有董事治理积极性越高,越能够提示应计盈余管理风险,审计师越倾向出具非标准审计意见;第一大非国有股东持股比例越高,混改国有企业股权集中度越低,非国有董事治理积极性与审计意见谨慎性的关系越显著。经过稳健性检验,研究结论不变。进一步研究发现,非国有董事积极履行治理职能导致审计意见质量提高有利于混改国有企业资产保值增值,实现国有企业混改主要目标。研究结论对于国有企业审计师正确决策审计意见、非国有董事有效维权、政府监管部门和混改国有企业充分尊重非国有董事治理的积极性、实现国有企业改革目标,均具有启示意义。
How to exert the enthusiasm of non-state-owned directors in governance so as to improve the quality of audit opinions of state-owned enterprises and realize the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets is an urgent issue to be studied in deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.Taking the A-share listed state-owned enterprises from 2013 to 2022 as samples,this paper constructs a discrete choice model,which takes non-affirmative vote as governance enthusiasm of non-state-owned directors.Research finds that the higher the governance enthusiasm of non-state-owned directors,the more they can indicate the risk of accrued earnings management,and the auditors are more inclined to issue non-standard audit opinions;the higher the shareholding ratio of the largest non-state-owned shareholder,the lower the shareholding concentration of the mixed-reform state-owned enterprises,and the more significant of the above basic relationships.After a series of robustness tests,the conclusion is still valid.Further research shows that the positive governance of non-state-owned directors improves the quality of audit opinions,which is conducive to maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned enterprises’assets and realizing the main goal of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises.The conclusions of this study have implications for auditors of state-owned enterprise to make audit opinions correctly,and helps non-state-owned directors to effectively defend their rights,or for government supervision departments and mixed-reform state-owned enterprises to fully respect the governance enthusiasm of non-state-owned directors,and achieve the goal of state-owned enterprise reform.
作者
吴秋生
姜一涵
独正元
WU Qiusheng;JIANG Yihan;DU Zhengyuan(School of Accounting,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China;School of Economics and Management,North University of China,Taiyuan 030027,China)
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第1期59-78,共20页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目“国家审计、协同监督与国企资产保值增值”(71872105)。
关键词
非国有董事治理
审计意见
股权结构
应计盈余管理
国有资产保值增值
Governance of Non-state-owned Director
Audit Opinion
Ownership Structure
Accrued Earnings Management
Preservation and Appreciation of State-owned Assets