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公司法上的受信义务:评新《公司法》的相应修改 被引量:6

Corporate Fiduciary Duties:Evaluation of Corresponding Amendments in the New Company Law
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摘要 新《公司法》关于受信义务的规定体现了创新精神:一是突出了关联交易、公司机会和竞业限制的重要性,完善了程序规则,重组了公司管理者的禁止性行为;对注意义务的界定突破了该条无法进入司法裁判的困境;将公司控股股东、实际控制人纳入了受信义务体系,并将股东代表诉讼扩及公司全资子公司。二是增加了董事、高管对第三人的赔偿责任。三是增加了董事责任保险。但新《公司法》依然与现实需求存在差距:一是关联交易的规定依然缺乏实质公平的裁判标准;公司机会缺乏界定,将导致司法审判困难;竞业限制不能适应现代企业;管理报酬未被纳入忠实义务,司法审判无据可循。二是注意义务规定不周延,未能对管理者的经营义务与监管义务区别对待。三是审计委员会取代监事机构的情形,股东代表诉讼之先诉请求不明确。新《公司法》关于受信义务的上述修改和问题有必要进行系统性分析与评估,从中也能间接省察今后的完善方向。 The new Corporation Law embodies the spirit of innovation on fiduciary duties.Firstly,it highlights the importance of related-party transactions,corporate opportunities,and non-compete restrictions,refining procedural rules and restructuring the prohibitive behaviors of corporate management.It breaks through the dilemma of the inability to enter judicial judgment on the duties of care.It incorporates controlling shareholders and ultimate controllers into the fiduciary duty system and extends shareholder derivative actions to wholly-owned subsidiaries of the corporation.Secondly,it increases the liability of directors and executives towards third parties.Thirdly,it introduces directors liability insurance.However,there still exists a gap between the new Corporation Law and practical needs.Firstly,the provisions on related-party transactions still lack substantive and fair judicial standards;the definition of corporate opportunities is lacking,leading to judicial difficulties;non-compete restrictions cannot adapt to modern enterprises;management compensation is not included in fiduciary duties,rendering judicial judgment unsupported.Secondly,the provisions on duties of care are not comprehensive enough,failing to distinguish between duties of business decision and duties of oversight.Thirdly,in cases where audit committees replace supervisory boards or supervisors,the pre-suit requests in shareholder derivative actions are not clear.Systematical analysis and evaluation are needed for the aforementioned modifications and issues regarding fiduciary duties in the new Corporation Law,indirectly indicating future directions for improvement.
作者 施天涛 Shi Tiantao
机构地区 清华大学法学院
出处 《财经法学》 CSSCI 2024年第3期51-66,共16页 Law and Economy
关键词 受信义务 忠实义务 注意义务 控制股东与实际控制人 派生诉讼 fiduciary duties duties of loyalty duties of care controlling shareholders and actual controllers derivative litigation
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二级参考文献101

  • 1苏永钦.以公法规范控制私法契约——两岸转介条款的比较与操作建议[J].人大法律评论,2010(1):3-26. 被引量:66
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  • 4《公司法》第149条第(一)、(七)项.
  • 5Reinler R. Kraakman et al., supra n., p. 118.
  • 6Marshall L. Small, Conflicts of Interest and the ALI Corporate Governance Project A Reporter's Perspective, 48 Bus. Law. 1377 (1993)
  • 78 Del. C. § 144.
  • 8Cal Corp Code§ 310.
  • 9Ahmed Bulbulia & Arthur R. Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards, 53 Notre Dame L.201, 205(1977).
  • 10《公司法》第149条第(四)项.

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