业绩考核制度如何影响中央企业预算松弛——基于准自然实验的经验证据

How does the Performance Appraisal System Affect the Budget Slack of Central Enterprises—Evidence from a Quasi Natural Experiments

预算松弛是企业预算管理与业绩考核的重要结合点。文章基于代理理论和权变理论,采用DID模型考察业绩考核制度对中央企业预算松弛的影响。研究发现:业绩考核制度通过降低第一类代理成本显著降低中央企业预算松弛度和预算执行偏差,这一效应在内部控制水平低的企业中表现更明显;业绩考核制度所引致的较低的预算松弛度和预算执行偏差有助于提升企业价值。监管部门应进一步完善业绩考核制度,提升治理效能,同时采取差异化监管措施,推动企业完善内部控制体系,为业绩考核制度治理效能的充分发挥提供有力的机制保障。

Budget slack is one of the important combination points of enterprise budget management and performance evalua-tion.Based on the agency theory and contingency theory,this paper examines the impact of performance appraisal systems on the budget slack of central enterprises using the DID(Difference-in-Differences)model.The results show that the performance appraisal system significantly reduces the degree of budget slack and budget execution deviation in central enterprises by re-ducing the first type of agency costs,and this effect is more pronounced in enterprises with low levels of internal control;the lower budget slack and budget execution deviation caused by the performance appraisal system can enhance the enterprise val-ue of central enterprises.In the future,regulators should further improve the performance appraisal system and improve the gov-ernance efficiency,and at the same time,differentiated regulatory measures should be adopted to promote the improvement of the internal control system of enterprises,so as to provide a strong mechanism guarantee for the full play of the governance effi-ciency of the performance appraisal system.