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需求波动下考虑平台赋能和碳交易机制的供应链协调问题

Supply chain coordination with an online platform considering platform power and cap-and-trade regulation under demand disruptions
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摘要 平台电子商务的快速发展给制造商带来了额外的渠道与市场,称为平台赋能。与此同时,在当前低碳经济的背景下,制造商的生产受到政府碳排放管制政策的制约。尤其是当市场面临需求波动时,制造商与平台的决策将会变得更加复杂。本文针对由一个制造商和一个平台组成的供应链,研究需求波动下考虑平台赋能和碳交易机制的供应链决策优化及协调问题。决策过程分成两个阶段:第一阶段制造商在确定性需求下制定生产计划;第二阶段制造商的销售面临需求不确定性。基于此,本文首先研究无需求波动下的决策优化及协调问题,接着进一步研究需求波动下的决策优化及协调问题。研究表明:(1)当平台赋能较弱时,最优减排水平随着碳配额的增加先上升后下降。当平台赋能适中时,最优生产量随着碳配额的增加先减少后增加;(2)当需求波动适中时,制造商的最优决策具有一定的鲁棒性;(3)当无需求波动或需求波动适中、平台赋能较强且平台佣金率较低时,供应链可以实现协调。 In the past ten years,with the rapid development of platform economy,more and more manufacturers have made profits by cooperating with e-commerce platforms.As a new sales channel,the platform brings additional market demand to manufacturers,known as“platform power.”At the same time,manufacturing enterprises emit a large amount of carbon dioxide during the production process.Governments worldwide have introduced various policies to promote the development of a low-carbon economy,among which the cap-and-trade regulation is recognized as one of the most effective emission reduction mechanisms.In this context,manufacturing enterprises produce and sell products through platforms,which will be affected by both platform power and carbon emission control.Especially when the market faces demand fluctuations,the decision-making of manufacturers and platforms will become more complex.This article studies the supply chain coordination problem considering platform power and cap-and-trade regulation under demand fluctuation,which can provide a theoretical reference for manufacturers and platforms to make operational decisions in the current market environment.Consider a supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single e-commerce platform.The manufacturer is constrained by the cap-and-trade regulation and faces demand disruptions when selling its products through the e-commerce platform;the platform gains revenue through commission,and the platform power brings additional market demand to the manufacturer.The decision-making process is divided into two stages.In the first stage(before the selling season),the manufacturer predicts demand and formulates the original production plan.At this time,there is no sales process in the market,and the manufacturer only makes planning and production decisions.In the second stage(during the selling season),products are sold in the market.Considering the impact of various factors on market demand,the actual market demand will deviate from the original production volume formulated before the selling season.The research process of this article is as follows.First,the optimal production and emission reduction decisions of the manufacturer without demand disruptions(i.e.,the first stage)and the conditions for supply chain coordination are analyzed.Then,the optimal production and emission reduction decisions of the manufacturer under demand disruptions(i.e.,the second stage)are discussed,the conditions for supply chain coordination are analyzed,and the results without demand disruptions are compared.The following conclusions are obtained:1)When the platform power is weak,the optimal emission reduction level first rises and then falls with the increase of carbon quota.When the platform power is moderate,the optimal production volume first decreases and then increases with the increase of carbon quota.When the platform power is strong,the optimal production volume and optimal emission reduction level are independent of carbon quota.2)When the demand disruption is moderate,the manufacturer′s optimal decision has a certain robustness.3)When there is no demand disruption,or the demand disruption is moderate,the platform power is strong,and the platform′s commission rate is low,the supply chain can achieve coordination.Finally,through the numerical example,the main theoretical results of the article are displayed,and the relationship between supply chain coordination efficiency and key parameters is depicted.The results show that when there is no demand disruption,the overall profit of the supply chain is slightly improved after the supply chain coordination,and the supply chain coordination efficiency decreases with the continuous enhancement of the platform power;when there is demand disruption,the overall profit of the supply chain is significantly improved after the supply chain coordination,but the supply chain coordination efficiency decreases with the increase of the demand increment in disruptions.Based on the research results,this article obtains the following managerial implications.First,manufacturers should support platforms to enhance their platform power,as this is conducive to producing more environmentally friendly products.Second,manufacturers can constrain production by carbon quota to control their carbon emissions.It should be noted that when the platform power is moderate,an increase in carbon quota will reduce production,thus reducing carbon emissions.Finally,to promote the cooperation between manufacturers and platforms,the platforms should continuously enhance their power abilities and reduce commission rates.Moreover,manufacturers and platforms should cooperate when market demand is stable or fluctuating moderately,as this is conducive to achieving supply chain coordination.
作者 徐小平 陈珈好 何平 吴婕 XU Xiaoping;CHEN Jiahao;HE Ping;WU Jie(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 230601,China;School of Business Administration,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510641,China)
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2024年第4期271-282,共12页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(72171001、71971087) 安徽省教育厅优秀青年科研项目(2022AH030005)。
关键词 需求波动 平台赋能能力 碳交易机制 供应链协调 Demand disruptions Platform power Cap-and-trade regulation Supply chain coordination
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