非处罚性市场监管、混合股东治理与公司违规——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

Non-penalty Market Regulations,Mixed Shareholders Governance and Corporate Fraud:Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

以问询函与关注函为代表的非处罚性市场监管以及国有股权与非国有股权相互制衡形成的混合股东治理机制为切入点,基于2014—2020年沪深A股非金融上市公司数据,考察抑制公司违规频发的有效途径。研究发现:非处罚性市场监管与混合股东治理均能够导致公司违规减少,二者呈现互补关系,该互补关系主要源自混合股东治理对关注函性质监管效力的正向调节作用、混合股东治理对问询函与关注函类型监管效果的传导功能以及问询函与关注函对混合股东治理效果的传导功能;收函次数、函件文本长度等非处罚性市场监管力度越强时,上述效果越为明显,且收函次数对公司违规趋势的监管效力更强。准自然实验结果显示,2017年《证券交易所管理办法》修订稿出台能够增强二者之间的互补关系,非国有产权、高效的司法行政环境与管理层法律背景有利于非处罚性市场监管与混合股东治理监督功能的发挥,非处罚性市场监管与混合股东治理引致的公司违规减少能够进一步提高投资者保护水平。研究结论有助于理解一线金融监管与混合所有制的制度合力保障资本市场有效运行的内在逻辑,为决策层有效预防微观市场失范行为、提高上市公司质量提供新思路。

Based on the non-penalty market regulations represented by inquiry and attention letters,and the mixed shareholders governance mechanism formed by checks and balances between state-owned equity and non-state-owned equity,using the data of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2020,the study investigates the effective ways to curb the frequent violation of the company,we find that non-penalty market regulations and mixed shareholders governance can curb the trend of corporate fraud,and there is a complementary relationship between the two.Furthermore,this complementary relationship is mainly derived from the positive adjustment effect of mixed shareholders governance on the regulatory effect of attention letters,the intermediary effect of mixed shareholders governance on the regulatory effect of inquiry and attention letters,and the intermediary effect of inquiry and attention letters on the mixed shareholders governance effect.In addition,we document more obvious effects when the firms face stronger non-penalty market regulations,such as receiving more or longer regulation letters,and the frequency of receiving regulation letters has a stronger regulatory effect on the trend of corporate fraud;quasi-natural experiment analysis shows that the revised“Measures on Stock Exchange”in 2017 can enhance the complementary relationship between the two;non-state-owned property right,efficient judicial and administrative environment and managers legal background can strengthen the supervision functions of non-penalty market regulations and mixed shareholders governance.Moreover,the reduction of corporate fraud brought about by non-penalty market regulations and mixed shareholders governance can further improve investor protection.The conclusions help to understand the internal logic of the institutional synergy of front-line financial regulation and mixed ownership promoting the effective operation of the capital market,and provide new approach for decision-makers on preventing corporate fraud and improving the quality of listed companies.