财务共享能降低成本粘性吗——基于集团管控的视角

Can Financial Sharing Reduce Cost Stickiness?Based on the Perspective of Group Control

本文基于数字技术环境下“集团管控”的视角,对财务共享是否及如何降低企业集团的成本粘性进行研究。研究结果显示,财务共享能够显著降低企业集团成本粘性,主要表现为:降低运营成本粘性,而非生产成本粘性;降低子公司运营成本粘性,而非母公司运营成本粘性。从作用机制而言,企业集团可以通过财务共享降低代理成本,或提升资源调整效率,进而降低成本粘性。从集团管控视角的拓展分析发现,当子公司产权性质为民营,盈余质量低,实施进攻型战略时,其资产、收入、利润占比越高,集团的管控动机越强,利用财务共享中心来降低成本粘性的作用越显著;当集团存在内部兼任、类型为产业型集团、多元化程度较低、内部资本市场配置效率较高时,集团的管控能力越强,利用财务共享中心来降低成本粘性的作用越显著。本文不仅丰富了财务共享与集团内部资源配置的研究,而且为数字技术与企业集团内部决策互动的研究提供了独特的视角与证据。

After the epidemic,the development of digital technology and economy has contributed a significant force in China's economic growth.More and more firms are undergoing or have completed digital transformation,and for most firms that are undergoing or have completed digital transformation,the first step is to establish a financial sharing center.Large-scale business groups are the best application scenarios for FSSCs,but there is not enough empirical evidence or conclusive evidence on the economic consequences of applying finance sharing to business groups.In China,business groups can avoid market imperfections by realizing economies of scale and synergies,but the actual effect depends on the motivation and ability of the group headquarters.Effective control can improve capital allocation efficiency and promote corporate innovation,while ineffective control can lead to negative effects such as defensive behavior.The study of group control involves investment,finance,strategy and other aspects,of which financial control is a prerequisite for other control,especially cost control is important,because the cost level directly affects product profitability and enterprise competitiveness.If a large business group utilizes FSSC,i.e.,further strengthens the control of financial aspects,can it show better cost control effects?This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008-2018 as a research samples,and uses both group headquarter and subsidiary’s financial data to empirically test whether large business groups utilize FSSC to achieve timely cost adjustment and thus reduce cost stickiness.The study shows that,first,FSSC significantly reduces the cost sticki-ness of business groups,especially the operating cost stickiness of sub-sidiaries,through process reengineering,financial standardization and standardization,and real-time and whole-process centralized control.Second,based on the agency perspective,FSSC reduces cost stickiness by lowering the agency cost,based on the efficiency perspective,when the resource adjustment is inefficient,the effect of FSSC on reducing operating cost stickiness is more obvious.In addition,the adjustment effect of FSSC on cost stickiness depends on group control motives and capabilities.When subsidiaries'assets,revenues and profits account for a high proportion,the nature of property rights is private,the quality of surplus is low,and the implementation of offensive strategy,the group control motives are strong,and the effect of FSSC on reducing cost stickiness is more significant.When the group has internal part-time,is an industrial group,has a low degree of diversification,and has a high degree of efficiency in the allocation of the internal capital market,the group control ability is strong,and the effect of FSSC on reducing cost stickiness is more significant.This paper contributed to both theory and reality.At the theoretical level,this paper first expands the FSSC field research.The current FSSC research mostly uses cases,questionnaires and literature induc-tion methods,and lacks empirical research based on financial data of listed companies.This paper expands the research perspective to group cost adjustment and decision-making and provides empirical evidence,which is an important addition to the field of FSSC consequences.Meanwhile,a large amount of literature proves that business groups can implement effective control over subsidiaries,but the specific path is not clear.This paper demonstrates that groups utilize FSSC to control cost adjustment decisions,and provides multi-dimensional evidence from the perspectives of group type,diversification,and in-ternal capital market adjustments,supplementing related research on financial decision-making and control of business groups.Finally,this paper provides new evidence of sticky cost adjustment from the novel perspective of large business groups utilizing FSSC for internal control,further complementing research in this area.In terms of practical significance,this paper firstly provides an import-ant reference for how firms can utilize FSSC to improve cost manage-ment.Through empirical research,this paper highlights how financial sharing can promote the transformation from traditional financial ac-counting systems to modern management accounting decision support systems by optimizing the cost data summarized in the sharing system to assist management decision-making.Meanwhile,the paper provides guidance on group production and operation cost control,parent-sub-sidiary control and executive team control.It demonstrates how the uni-fied pooling of information,knowledge,experience and personnel can help the group to control effectively.Financial sharing can not only play the role of supervision and governance,reduce internal agency costs and optimize the efficiency of resource allocation,but also enhance the flexibility of subsidiaries in responding to internal and external environments,and improve the efficiency of adjusting operating costs.However,as the current FSSC is still limited in the control of the pro-duction process,the future needs to deepen its functions to improve the efficiency of the group's resource control.Finally,this paper provides a reference for firms to understand the factors affecting cost management efficiency.Timely adjustment of costs to adapt to changes in operating income and the implementation of lean cost management is one of the important paths for large enterprise groups to maintain profitability.This paper finds that financial sharing can improve cost management efficiency,which is an important guidance for optimizing cost manage-ment decisions.