连锁董事如何影响上市公司审计费用?——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

How Do the Interlocked Directors Affect the Audit Fees of Listed Companies?Empirical Evidence from Chinese A-share Listed Companies

以中国A股上市公司为样本,基于繁忙假说、共谋假说检验了连锁董事对上市公司审计费用的影响及作用机理。研究发现,连锁董事会增加上市公司审计费用,且连锁董事的广度与深度均能显著增加上市公司审计费用。影响机制检验表明,连锁董事提高了上市公司的财务风险,进而导致上市公司审计费用的增加。进一步研究发现,在内部连锁董事、非国有企业、机构投资者持股比例较高以及上市公司存在内部控制重大缺陷的情境中,连锁董事对上市公司审计费用的正向影响更强。相关结论进一步丰富了连锁董事任职和审计费用领域的理论研究,也可以为会计师事务所优化审计定价决策和上市公司完善公司治理制度提供参考。

This paper takes the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies,and tests the influence of interlocked directors on the audit fees and the action mechanism of listed companies based on the busy hypothesis and collusion hypothesis.Research found that the interlocked directors increases the audit fees of listed companies,and the breadth and depth of the interlocked directors can significantly increase the audit fees of listed companies.The inspection of the influence mechanism found that the interlocked directors aggravated the financial risk of listed companies,and then increased the audit fees of listed companies.Further research shows that the positive impact of interlocked directors on audit fees of listed companies is more stronger in the internal director interlocked,non-state-owned enterprises,institutional investors hold a high shareholding ratio and listed companies have major defects in internal control.The relevant conclusions further enrich the theoretical research in the field of interlocking director tenure and audit fees,and can also provide references for accounting firms to optimize audit pricing decisions and listed companies to improve corporate governance system.