国有企业政治关联、政府审计质量和企业绩效——基于我国A股市场的实证研究

Political Connections of State-owned Firms,Government Audit Quality and Firms' Performance: An Empirical Study Based on China's A-share Market

在我国,国有上市公司既拥有股权政治关联又拥有高管政治关联。相对于樊纲指数,更为微观的政府审计质量是影响政治关联对国有企业绩效作用发挥的重要因素。在不考虑政府审计质量的情况下,国有股权政治关联会降低企业的绩效,而高管政治关联会提升企业绩效;在考虑政府审计质量的情况下,政府审计质量越高,高管政治关联提升作用越不明显,也越会降低股权政治关联对企业绩效的损害作用。因此,提高政府审计质量可以改善国有企业的生存环境,优化资源的配置,促进企业的健康发展。

In China, the state-owned listed companies have either innate political connection or have executives ' political connection. In contrast to Fan Gang index, government audit quality, a more microscopic environment, is one of the important factors of political connection corporate performance. We find that, without considering the government audit quality, state-owned equity political association reduces the corporate performance, while executives' political association improves the corpo-rate performance;when considering government audit quality, the higher the government audit quality is, the more it reduces state-owned equity political association's damaging effect on corporate performance. Therefore, we suggest that improving the quality of government audit can improve the living environment of political connection companies, optimize the allocation of re-sources, and promote the healthy development of enterprises.